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ABSTRACT
Changes in the economy have brought about attempts to improve the 
structure of the corporate organization and the quality of corporate 
financial reporting. One such attempt has been to increase the re­
sponsibilities of corporate boards of directors, and subcommittees to 
handle specific duties of the board have been established. The audit 
committee is one of these subcommittees and is now required for all 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
The corporate audit committee should make a significant contri­
bution toward improving the integrity and credibility of financial 
statements and the overall corporate image in the public sector. To 
accomplish this goal, the audit committee must aid in preserving ex­
ternal auditor independence in both appearance and in fact. In addition, 
the committee should add stature and importance to the internal audit 
function.
Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities and 
functions will have an impact on all segments of the business community. 
To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of these objec­
tives, responsibilities and functions. The SEC, the New York Stock 
Exchange, the AICPA, Congress and others have consistently supported 
the establishment of audit committees, but no minimum standards of 
performance have been instituted.
The purpose of this study was to determine the functions that 
should be performed by audit committees as perceived by three groups:
vii
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
audit committee members, CPA firm audit partners and a financial state­
ment user group composed of financial analysts and bankers. Differences 
in opinions among these groups were identified.
A determination of the effectiveness of current audit committee 
performance as perceived by audit committee members and CPA firm audit 
partners was also made. Again, differences in opinions between groups 
were identified. Also, an attempt was made to determine the charac­
teristics of audit committees that were currently functioning effectively.
Data were collected by mail questionnaires. Appropriate statistical 
tests were used to evaluate the responses.
According to survey results, the differences in opinions of the 
three groups were statistically significant for most of the audit committee 
functions presented for consideration. Most of these differences, how­
ever, were caused by the extent of agreement indicated by the respondents. 
The groups were generally uniform in the belief that current audit 
committee performance is effective and future performance of some set of 
minimum duties is desirable. Audit committees can be an integral part 
of the corporate organization if the effectiveness of their performance 
is adequate to meet the expectations of the business community and the 
general public.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In an ever changing economy, there will be continuing attempts to 
Improve the structure of the corporate organization and the quality 
of corporate financial reporting. The importance of corporations to 
the American economy makes it necessary to review constantly and to 
revise the corporate structure and the standards of financial reporting.
The critics of corporate governance readily identify weaknesses 
in the corporate system. Antibusiness and anticorporate attitudes are 
not new in American political history, but perhaps never before have 
the critics been more strident in their accusations, more zealous in 
their crusade for reforms. Public confidence has sagged; public regu­
lation has proliferated. Proposals abound for more accountability and 
more control of corporate activities. And there is the expectation 
that outside directors will become more involved in monitoring coiporate 
conduct and governance.'*'
A significant effort to improve the corporate image and restore 
public confidence in the business community has been to increase the 
corporate boards of directors' responsibilities in financial affairs.
As a further step, audit committees have been established and given 
more responsibility.
One especially positive indicator of the business community's 
desire to improve its image to the general public has been a change in 
management's attitude toward audit committees. No longer is the
1
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prevailing attitude one of skepticism about the need for an audit com­
mittee or doubt about its ability to accomplish something constructive. 
Rather, those responsible for corporate governance are concerned that 
all appropriate areas of the corporate organization are subject to 
2
effective audit committee oversight. Audit committees help assure 
that the best use is being made of both the public accountants and the 
internal auditors in maintaining the integrity cf financial reporting 
and compliance with the law and accepted standards of ethical behavior.^
Perceived Role of Audit Committees
Audit committees will have an impact on all segments of the 
business community. To date, however, there has been no clear delinea­
tion of the objectives, responsibilities and functions of these 
committees.
The Metcalf Report. The most authoritative pronouncements con­
cerning audit committees appeared in the "Report of the Subcommittee 
on Reports, Accounting and Management" of the United States Senate 
Committee on Government Operations (the Metcalf Report), and the SEC 
"Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's 
Oversight Role." The Metcalf Committee stated:
"The major purpose of a corporate audit com­
mittee should be to handle relations with the 
independent auditor, improve internal auditing 
controls, and establish appropriate policies 
to prohibit unethical, questionable, or illegal 
activities by corporate employees. An audit 
committee should have sole authority to hire 
the independent auditor, set the audit fee, and 
dismiss the auditor. In addition, the audit 
committee should meet privately with the in­
dependent auditor, receive full reports from 
the auditing firm on its findings, and be in-
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formed of all services being provided to the 
corporation by the auditing firm."4
The SEC Report. The SEC Report to Congress suggested several 
functions that an effective audit committee should perform:
(1) Engage and discharge outside auditors.
(2) Review the engagement of the auditors,
including the fee, scope and timing of
the audit and any other services rendered.
(3) Review with the auditors and management 
a company's policies and procedures with 
respect to internal auditing, accounting 
and financial controls.
(4) Review with the independent auditors, 
upon completion of their audit:
(a) any report or opinion proposed to 
be rendered in connection therewith;
(b) the independent auditor's perceptions 
of the company's financial and ac­
counting personnel (usually in 
private session);
(c) the cooperation which the independent 
auditor received during the course 
of their review;
(d) the extent to which the resources of 
the company were and should be 
utilized to minimize time spent by 
the outside auditors;
(e) any significant transactions which are 
not a normal part of the company's 
business;
(f) any change in accounting principles 
and practices and the methods of 
applying them;
(g) all significant adjustments proposed 
by the auditor; any recommendations 
which the independent auditor may have 
with respect to improving internal ac­
counting controls, choice of accounting 
principles, or management systems.
(5) Inquire of the appropriate coup any personnel 
and the independent auditors as to any in­
stances of deviations from established codes 
of conduct of the company and periodically 
review such policies.
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(6) Meet with the company's financial staff 
periodically to review and discuss with them 
the scope of internal accounting and audit­
ing procedures then in effect; and the extent 
to which recommendations made by the internal 
staff or by the independent auditor have been 
implemented.
(7) Review significant press releases concerning 
financial matters.5
The Metcalf and SEC reports both emphasize the importance of audit 
committee involvement with external and internal audit affairs. The 
Metcalf Report confines its specific recommendations to audit committee 
responsibilities and duties relating to the independent auditor. The 
SEC report also specifically suggests audit committee functions 
relating to external auditors but in addition makes suggestions for 
duties relating to internal controls and management activities.
Lack of Audit Committee Standards. With no required minimum 
standards of performance, various factions may attempt to dictate to 
audit committees according to their own puipose. For example, critics 
of corporate governance and independent auditing have seized upon audit 
committees as a means to introduce substantive changes in the corporate 
structure. Some of these critics have prescribed audit committee duties 
and responsibilities that few audit committee members are qualified to 
perform.6
The duties of the audit committee should be realistic and con­
sistent with the capabilities of its members. Rarely will any of the 
committee members have professional training in the field of public
7
accounting. Therefore, the committee cannot be expected to take 
responsibility for the quality of the independent auditor's work or
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the coupleteness of financial statement presentation. Matters of 
compliance with professional reporting standards and technical dis­
closure are the responsibilities of corporate management and the 
professional experts such as the outside auditor and legal counsel.**
The audit committee cannot be expected to assume direct responsi­
bility for the operating effectiveness of internal controls and 
accounting systems. The audit committee is concerned with financial 
statement disclosure, the adequacy of accounting controls and the scope 
of the outside auditors' work. The committee is indeed responsible
for reviewing these matters, but not for assuming responsibility for 
q
any of them.
If the tendency is to demand more of corporate audit committees 
than many of them can provide, this may lead to a decrease in their 
effectiveness, further disappointment with and criticism of business 
and an unwarranted conclusion that private enteiprise cannot set its 
own house in order.1**
Current Problems in Corporate Reporting
The overall objective of the audit function is to increase the 
credibility, integrity and reliability of the financial statements.11 
An effective audit committee should contribute significantly to this 
objective.
Serious questions have been raised about the integrity of the
12entire corporate recordkeeping and auditing system. These questions 
are partially due to environmental changes. The credibility, integrity 
and reliability of financial statements and the corporate reporting 
system have been influenced by several changes in the business, investor
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and legal environments.
Changes in the Business Environment. In the business environ­
ment, the most significant and far-reaching change is in the structure 
of American business resulting from merger. The current merger trend 
has lasted longer and is substantially larger than any prior merger 
movement in American history. In addition, this merger period is 
unique because conglomerate mergers are now dominant. In prior periods 
of merger activity vertical and horizontal mergers dominated.13
There are also significant changes in the types of conglomerate 
mergers. In prior years, most conglomerate mergers involved a market 
or product extension by the acquiring firm. A market extension merger 
is one in which two firms selling the same product, but in different 
geographic markets, merge. In a product extension merger the acquiring 
firm brings together a number of related products which may be distri­
buted through the same marketing channels. There has also been a 
substantial increase in conglomerate mergers in which there is little 
discernible relationship between the activities of the acquiring and 
the acquired firm. The size of firms acquired has also increased 
substantially.1^
The conglomerate merger movement has focused attention on three 
immediate questions in financial reporting. How is an acquisition to 
be treated - as a purchase, or as a pooling of interests? How can we 
assure that the resultant earnings per share figure is stated as ac­
curately and as consistently as possible? Finally, how do we disclose 
the financial data which will show the relative contribution to earnings 
per share of the various lines of business of a conglomerate?13
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The common factor running through all of these questions is the 
inpact of a business combination on earnings per share. Investors 
want to know the effect of an acquisition on earnings per share and 
to be able to compare earnings through acquisitions with earnings 
through internal growth. When a company diversifies into unrelated 
activities, the investor may no longer receive information from the 
financial statements of the acquired companies. The prospects of the 
conglomerate are then measured by a figure which reports the total 
profitability of the enterprise and which tells the investor little
about the risk, profitability or growth of each segment.1^
Mother change in the business environment is the improvement in
internal reporting systems of corporations. With the formidable as­
sistance of the computer, systems have been developed for providing 
timely and reliable internal information. As these internal reporting 
systems become more sophisticated, demands may increase for more dis­
closure of material information contained in the resulting internal 
reports. For example, investors may desire information about such 
matters as the performance of managers and intra-company transactions. 
At present, internal reports are considered management tools and pub­
lication of these reports could both mislead investors and help 
17competitors.
Corporate reporting is also complicated by accelerating technology 
cal changes in the business environment. Technological changes have 
created new industries, such as computer leasing, where the accountant 
must apply accounting principles to novel business transactions and 
arrangements.̂
Changes in the Investor Environment. Changes in the investor
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environment have been characterized by an increase in the proportion
of institutional investors. Such institutions demand, and can digest,
more information than most individual stockholders. Their investment
19committees are backed up by full-time financial analysts.
The field of financial analysis, which began early in the twentieth
century in the larger insurance companies and trust departments of 
banks, has emerged over the last thirty years with a public identity. 
Many universities in the United States have established graduate pro­
grams in financial analysis. A growing corps of analysts regularly 
interview the managements of corporate enterprises in which there is 
any sizeable degree of public interest. The result is widespread
dissemination of description, commentary, and analysis, as well as
20criticism, of the progress and prospects of these companies.
The emergence of the financial analyst, and the growing importance 
of the institutions he represents, have the following implications for 
corporate financial reporting:
(1) Financial analysts are increasingly sophisticated 
readers of financial reports. Their abilities 
must be taken into account when the report is 
prepared. The report cannot be prepared with 
only the lay reader in mind.
(2) Financial analysts are asking for more information 
about conpanies than has been universally disclosed 
in the past. Many of their institutions do, or 
have the potential to, influence investments to 
such an extent that many managements will accede
to their requests. Some institutional investors, 
with such large holdings that liquidation would 
seriously depress market prices, may feel 
"locked in" to the point where they have to 
interest themselves much more directly in coiporate 
affairs and developments than the classical idea of 
the ephemeral investor would suggest.
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(3) Corporate managements who disclose information 
to a few inquiring analysts will tend to make 
similar disclosure to all stockholders, so as 
not to run the risks attached to selective
disclosure.21
Changes in the Legal Environment. The growth of the institu­
tional investor, his greater sophistication and access to companies, 
has raised questions about fairness in the distribution and timing of 
the release of material coiporate information. The near instant 
liquidity of our securities markets which makes it possible to act 
upon information quickly, explains regulatory preoccupation with ques­
tions of fairness. The SEC and the stock exchanges have been concerned
with insuring fair dealing in the market through adequate disclosure of 
22financial information.
The securities markets are now public markets both in fact and
contemplation of law. The markets of the twenties were professional
markets which represented themselves as public markets. Now the markets
have become truly public markets which must be shared with professionals,
including institutions. If the individual investor is to continue to
have confidence in the markets, he must be assured that these markets
23do, in fact, also serve individual investors.
In addition to the change in the securities market, the legal 
environment has also been affected by the increase in the legal responsi­
bilities of accountants as a result of case law. Accountants must 
work under the federal securities laws which impose liability even for 
non-negligent mistakes. And if, for example, a company goes bankrupt, 
they inevitably find themselves in the middle of controversies between 
creditors, stockholders and others.2^
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Traditionally, suits against accountants by third parties were 
unsuccessful. The Ultramares case, a landmark decision, seemed until 
recently to foreclose successful investor actions against accountants 
for false and misleading financial statements. This has been slowly 
changing over the years and decisions such as that in Yale Express 
indicate that the courts are not reluctant to extend accountants' 
liability.25
Independent auditors are increasingly aware of legal responsibility 
and potential liability. Since the early 1960's, lawsuits against all 
professionals have increased dramatically and CPAs are no exception to 
this trend. In the United States, there have been more lawsuits against 
public accountants in the past decade than in the entire previous 
history of the profession.26 There are no simple reasons for this 
trend, but the following are major factors:
(1) The greater complexity of auditing and account­
ing due to such factors as the increasing size 
of business, the existence of the computer, and 
the intricacies of business operations.
(2) The growing awareness of the responsibilities 
of public accountants on the part of users of 
financial statements.
(3) An increased consciousness on the part of the SEC 
regarding its responsibility for protecting in­
vestors' interests.
(4) Society's increasing acceptance of lawsuits by 
injured parties against anyone who might be 
able to provide compensation, regardless of 
who is at fault.
(5) Large civil court judgments against CPA firms 
in a few cases, which have encouraged attorneys 
to provide legal services on a contingent fee 
basis. This arrangement offers the injured 
party a potential gain when the suit is suc­
cessful, but minimal loss when it is unsuccess­
ful.
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(6) The willingness of CPA firms to settle out of 
court in an attempt to avoid legal fees and 
adverse publicity rather than resolve through 
the judicial process the legal problems facing 
the profession.
(7) The many alternative accounting principles from 
which clients can elect to present their finan­
cial statements, and the lack of clear-cut 
criteria for the auditor to evaluate whether the 
proper alternative was selected.
(8) The increasing number of business failures 
directly related to the dishonesty of management.
(9) The willingness of some CPAs to succumb to 
management’s pressures to ensure their retention 
as auditors.27
In an effort to avoid lawsuits and legal liability, CPA firms must 
consistently exhibit professional conduct and ethical behavior. Pro­
fessional independence in audit engagements must be maintained in 
appearance and in fact so as not to provide a basis for a potential 
lawsuit. The general business community is aware of the requirement 
and reputation for independence of CPA firms. Therefore, independence 
is one of the more visible indications of professional conduct. The 
CPAs' realization of this visibility should cause them to take all 
reasonable steps necessaiy to provide assurance to the public of their 
independence.
At the time of adoption of the federal securities laws, the decision 
was made that an independent accounting profession rather than govern­
ment auditors should be the means for assuring the public of full and 
fair corporate financial reporting. The responsibilities of auditors 
to shareholders and investors were not precisely delineated. The re­
sults of present litigation may bring a better definition of these 
responsibilities consistent with both the practicalities of accounting
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
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28and the policies of the federal securities laws.
Changes in the environment will continue to have an impact on
corporate financial reporting. However, no matter what changes take
place and regardless of their effect, users of financial statements
will still require reliable financial information. The role of audit
committees must be defined in light of both the changing environment
and the needs and demands of users. A delineation of responsibilities
of audit committees must include duties that will enable the audit
committee to contribute to the reliability of the corporate reporting
system and the credibility and integrity of the financial statements.
The Role of the Independent Auditor
Auditors have been attesting to credibility of financial repre-
29sentations at least since the fifteenth century. The exact origin
of audits of financial reports is in dispute, but it is known that
as early as the fifteenth century auditors were called upon to attest
to the absence of fraud in the records kept by stewards of wealthy
household estates in England. While the origins of attestations are
ancient, development of the attest function has occurred most rapidly 
30in the last century.
The independent audit function adds credibility to financial 
statements. The auditor's endorsement provides some degree of assur­
ance as to (1) the reliability of the financial data incoiporated in 
the financial statements and (2) the propriety of the presentations of 
such data including disclosure of all pertinent information. Without 
this added credibility, financial statements could be deemed of ques­
tionable reliability which would render them of limited value to
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creditors, investors and government regulatory agencies.^
A three-party relationship exists for CPAs who serve as independent 
auditors of publicly-owned coiporations. The three parties in interest 
are the CPA, the client corporation and the public. Although the 
independent auditor is retained and paid by the corporate client, the 
federal securities laws clearly require that the services of the 
independent auditor be performed for the benefit of the public. The 
coiporation also benefits from the external audit and accounting ser­
vices designed to produce reliable information on the results of
coiporate activities, but the federal securities laws were not enacted
32for the corporation's benefit.
Auditor Independence. A major responsibility of independent 
auditors is to perform their services while maintaining strict inde­
pendence from their clients, both in fact and in appearance. Public 
confidence in the accuracy and usefulness of corporate financial 
information depends upon a firm belief that such information has been 
certified by qualified auditors who are truly independent. Confidence
in the independence of auditors requires that they have no direct or
33indirect interest in the affairs of their clients.
The Securities and Exchange Commission rule no. 210.2-01 (Regula­
tion S-X) states the position of the SEC on auditor independence as 
follows:
"The Commission will not recognize any certified 
public accountant or public accountant as inde­
pendent who is not in fact independent. For 
example, an accountant will be considered not 
independent with respect to any person or any of 
its parents, its subsidiaries, or other affiliates
(1) in which, during the period of his professional 
engagement to examine the financial statements 
being reported on or at the date of his report, he
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or his firm or a member thereof had, or was 
committed to acquire, any direct financial 
interest or any material indirect financial 
interest; (2) with which, during the period of 
his professional engagement to examine the finan­
cial statements being reported on, at the date of 
his report or during the period covered by the 
financial statements, he or his firm or a member 
thereof was connected as a promoter, underwriter, 
voting trustee, director, officer, or employee, 
except that a firm will not be deemed not inde­
pendent in regard to a particular person if a 
former officer or employee of such person is employed 
by the firm and such individual has conpletely dis­
associated himself from the person and its affiliates 
and does not participate in auditing financial statements 
of the person or its affiliates covering any period of 
his employment by the person.
In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not 
independent with respect to a particular person, the 
Commission will give appropriate consideration to all 
relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on 
all relationships between the accountant and that person 
or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself 
to the relationships existing in connection with the 
filing of reports with the Commission."34
Thus, the requirements are clear that a CPA acting as an indepen­
dent auditor of a publicly-owned corporation must be independent in 
fact with regard to his total relationship with that corporate client. 
The standards of conduct followed by independent auditors must preserve 
their independence.33
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Code of 
Professional Ethics includes a comprehensive set of rules, interpreta­
tions, and rulings which require the Institute's members to avoid 
situations that would create conflicts of interest or bias, either in 
appearance or in fact.3^ The code recognizes the public's expectation 
that a CPA will have certain character traits - primarily integrity 
and objectivity and, in the practice of auditing, independence.3^
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Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS) Nos. 1 and 4 emphasize 
the appearance of independence. The elusive and indefinable nature 
of independence has caused the accounting profession, led by the SEC, 
to attempt to spell out detailed prohibitions, not only against those 
activities or relationships that might actually erode the mental 
attitude of independence but also against those that might even sug­
gest or imply a possibility of lack of independence.38
The SEC, the AICPA and the entire accounting profession have 
shown that they are dedicated to preserving auditor independence in 
appearance and in fact. The importance that is placed on independence 
is emphasized by the large amount of authoritative literature that has 
been issued on the subject.
Even with the efforts of the accounting profession, auditor 
independence has still been subject to criticism and attack. The Met­
calf Report sharply criticized auditor independence. The report stated 
thac the large CPA firms have used their designated reputation for 
independence to market a variety of nonaccounting services. The 
subcommittee report cites examples of activities undertaken by large 
accounting firms which contradict their claim to act independently in 
the public interest. The report states explicitly that "the ’big eight1
7X)
accounting firms are in fact not independent."
The report states that the lack of independence of large CPA firms 
results from the scope of client services they perform for profit and 
the activities they undertake on their own. Management advisory ser­
vices is cited as the primary problem area regarding the services 
offered by the CPA firms because it necessarily involves the CPA in the
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business operations of their corporate clients. Management advisory 
services such as executive recruitment, actuarial services and financial 
management services reflect, in the committee's opinion, a conflict of 
interest for the independent auditor. Tax services and representation 
of client's interests are also mentioned as activities of CPAs which 
contribute to their loss of independence.40
The accounting profession, the SEC, and responsible leaders of 
the financial community have recognized that a practical threat to an 
auditor's professional, independent mental attitude is that he is often 
selected, retained or replaced at the sole discretion of the management 
on whose representations he is expected to report. Some steps have been 
taken to deal with this threat. Some companies require that the selec­
tion and retention of auditors be ratified by the stockholders and the 
SEC requires public notice (Form 8-K) of termination of auditors, dis­
closure of any accounting disputes between client and former auditor 
within two years, and a letter from the auditor concurring in such 
disclosure.4’*'
Audit Committees and Auditor Independence. Corporate executives, 
nonofficer directors and independent CPAs recognize that a properly 
constituted audit committee of the board of directors can provide a 
means of strengthening audit independence without direct interference 
in corporate affairs.43 Auditors and audit committees are equally 
concerned with independent judgments of financial decisions, and their 
mutual interests are strengthened by a formal working relationship.43 
External auditors should have direct and regular communication with 
the audit committee on significant matters. This will enhance the
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appearance of their independence from management, and when the com­
mittee demonstrates its effectiveness by active performance, stock­
holders and the financial community will more readily recognize that 
such independence actually exists.^
The Internal Audit Function
Audit committees should also add stature and importance to the
internal audit function. Many companies have internal audit departments.
The function has grown in size and stature and professional societies
of internal auditors have been established which offer specialized
courses, conferences, and publications devoted to the subject.^ The
internal auditors are involved in policing the effectiveness of internal
control. To the extent they are successful, the internal auditors
46strengthen the effectiveness of the system of internal control.
The importance of internal control was emphasized further by the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The Act contains significant 
internal control and recordkeeping requirements that may have little, 
if anything, to do with corrupt foreign payments. The Act made internal 
accounting controls a matter of law for all SEC-reporting companies, 
not just those that have foreign operations.
The legislative history indicated that Congress's prime interest 
was to prevent corrupt payments to foreign officials and that the 
requirements for accurate books and systems of internal accounting 
control are intended to help in accomplishing that objective. The 
Act's provisions dealing with accurate books and records and internal 
accounting control are, however, considerably more far-reaching since
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those requirements cover all transactions, not just those related to 
47foreign payments.
Specifically, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which 
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires that all SEC 
registered companies devise anc maintain a system of internal account­
ing controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that:
(1) Transactions are executed in accordance with 
management's general or specific authoriza­
tion.
(2) Transactions are recorded as necessary to 
(a) permit preparation of financial state­
ments in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles or any other criteria 
applicable to such statements, and (b) maintain 
accountability for assets.
(3) Access to assets is permitted only in ac­
cordance with management's general or 
specific authorization.
(4) The recorded accountability for assets is 
compared with the existing assets at reason­
able intervals, and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to any differences.48
By early 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission had already 
instituted legal action against two companies for violating the internal 
control and recordkeeping provisions of the Act. In the case against 
Aminex Resources Corporation and two of its officers, failure to comply 
with the law is cited as part of a charge of an alleged misappropria­
tion of corporate assets exceeding one million dollars. The court 
granted a temporary restraining order and the appointment of a temporary
receiver to protect Aminex's remaining assets and correct recordkeeping 
49deficiencies.
Page Airways, Inc., and six of its executives are the subject of
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includes charges of illegal foreign payments, the SEC does not allege 
foreign bribery violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - 
apparently because the payments were made before the Act’s effective 
date of December 19, 1977. However, the Commission is charging viola­
tions of the internal control and recordkeeping rules because some of 
the questionable payments were effected without adequate documenta­
tion and controls.̂
The Securities and Exchange Commission obviously intends to 
exercise its authority in regulating the internal controls of public 
conpanies. The SEC may well take the position that the only appropriate 
control over certain internal control activities is the establishment 
of an audit committee of the board of directors. Thus, the failure of 
a company to institute such a committee, conposed of outside directors, 
would constitute a violation of the Act. The SEC has issued so many 
pronouncements calling for the establishment of audit committees that 
any board which fails to do so may have to justify its actions in 
court.
The audit committee of the board of directors is in a unique 
position to coordinate and oversee the activities of all parties that 
contribute to effective financial reporting. The effectiveness of the 
internal control system can be monitored through a close working 
relationship with the internal audit staff. The professional conduct 
of the external audit can also be monitored by the audit committee 
through direct communication with the independent auditors. The ex­
ternal and internal auditors are provided with a forum for their
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grievances and recommendations that does not involve management. The 
audit committee, as a subcommittee of the board of directors, has 
authority to require that management seriously consider the recommenda­
tions from both the external and internal auditors.
The expectations of the business community for audit committees 
are great. To live up to these expectations and meet the challenges 
they are sure to encounter, audit committees must have a definite role 
within the corporate structure. The responsibilities and duties of these 
committees must clearly reflect their intended contribution to improving 
corporate accountability.
The general public and financial leaders will be evaluating audit 
committee effectiveness on the basis of their impact on external auditor 
independence, internal control and internal audit effectiveness, and 
finally their contribution toward assuring creditors, investors and 
other interested parties of the integrity, reliability and credibility 
of financial reporting.
Purpose of the Study
The attention of those segments of the business community interested 
in improving the corporate image and the credibility and integrity of 
financial statements should now be directed toward defining the audit 
committee's responsibilities and enhancing the quality of the committee's 
work. Ralph Ferrera, the Securities and Exchange Commission General 
Counsel, stated his views on the current status of audit committees in 
an address to the Southwestern Legal Foundation:
"When the Commission calls for audit committees, 
the call is for effective, responsible audit
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
21
committees, and not merely non-functioning, albeit 
decorative shells. Regrettably, a survey published 
in the Coopers § Lybrand Audit Committee Guide 
states that among responding corporations only 
601 cf the audit committees choose the outside 
accountant and only 40% review the yearly audit 
before its release. The most common audit 
function--reviewing the management letter--was 
performed only in two-thirds of the corporations.
Frankly, I do not know what the other so-called 
audit committees are doing, but the Coopers §
Lybrand study does not suggest that the effort 
underway in the private sector is anywhere near 
the quality necessaiy to insure against pre­
emptive federal action."52
While a large part of the problem is undoubtedly that some audit 
committees are the decorative shells to which Mr. Ferrara referred, 
equal danger lies in overloading the committee with responsibilities 
tangential or unrelated to their primaiy one. The audit committee 
should be permitted to concentrate on working with the coiporation’s 
internal and external accountants. The importance and uniqueness of 
that function militates strongly against requiring audit committee 
members to direct their attention to other duties.53
There is an immediate need to determine the necessary duties and 
functions of audit committees and to establish minimum standards of 
performance. While the support of audit committees by various segments 
of the business community is a definite step toward improving the 
credibility and integrity of financial statements, more concrete efforts 
are necessary.
The determination of specific responsibilities and functions that 
should be required of all audit committees would be beneficial to 
financial statement users as well as audit committee members themselves. 
Financial statement users could be confident that the existence of an
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audit committee insured that certain functions designed to improve 
the credibility and integrity of the financial statements were actually 
performed. Also, the incidence of misconceptions among users about 
the role of audit committees within the corporate organization would 
be minimized.
Audit committee members could be more confident as to what their 
responsibilities and functions are. Once these responsibilities and 
functions are defined, the committee members can concentrate on 
improving their skills to meet these responsibilities. In addition, 
the audit committee members could be assured that they have satisfied 
at least the minimum requirements for their committee.
A determination of required minimum functions for audit committees 
could also influence the composition of the committee. Members of the 
board of directors could be selected for the audit committee according 
to whether the skills they possess are compatible with the functions 
to be performed.
Desirable Audit Committee Functions. The purpose of this study 
is to determine the functions that should be performed by audit commit­
tees as perceived by three groups: audit committee members, CPA firm
audit partners and a financial statement user group conposed of 
financial analysts and bankers.
A core set of desirable audit committee functions will be presented 
to each of the participants. They will be asked to give their per­
ception of the importance of each function. The possible functions will 
be in two distinct categories - those that relate to external auditor 
independence and those that relate to internal auditing. The core set
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of functions was determined from the current literature.
The three groups of participants in this study were selected 
because of the difference in their relation to corporations and 
corporate financial statements. Audit committee members are responsi­
ble to stockholders in an oversight capacity for adequate financial 
reporting and disclosure. A properly active and involved audit com­
mittee serves to protect the corporate interest by overseeing the 
auditor and company management.54
CPA firm audit partners are responsible for rendering an opinion 
as to the fairness with which the financial statements are presented.
The CPA's opinion is relied upon by stockholders, creditors, regulator/ 
agencies and other interested parties.
Financial statement users are the final beneficiaries of any action 
taken to improve the credibility, integrity and reliability of finan­
cial statements. Their perceptions of the importance of audit committee 
functions may affect any decisions that these users make concerning a 
company and its financial statements.
Each of the three participating groups sees corporate financial 
reporting from a different perspective. Any suggestion of required 
minimum audit committee functions must consider the desires, needs and 
opinions of these groups.
Audit Committee Effectiveness. A determination of how effectively 
audit committees are currently performing certain functions as perceived 
by audit committee members and CPA firm audit partners will also be made. 
Any differences in opinions of the two groups will be identified. The 
resulting differences will be used to identify any misconceptions about
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the effectiveness of audit committees and the current impact of audit 
committees on the corporate organization. If the CPAs and audit com­
mittee members have differing opinions on current committee effective­
ness, this could indicate the need for a closer working relationship 
and more interaction between these two groups.
Audit Committee Characteristics. Characteristics of audit commit­
tees and their related companies will be determined. Implications of 
characteristics such as size of the company and size, age and composi­
tion of the audit committee will be evaluated to identify any correla­
tion between them and the number of effectively performed functions.
A high degree of association between the number of effectively performed 
functions and certain committee characteristics could indicate the 
relative importance of the audit committee in certain companies. A 
high correlation could also indicate some steps that companies with 
ineffective audit committees might take to improve committee performance. 
For example, more audit committee members with auditing backgrounds 
might be indicated. The number of effectively performed functions 
to be used in the correlation analysis will be based on responses of 
the audit committee members.
Method of Data Collection
Data for this research project will be obtained from questionnaires 
to be sent to three different groups. Audit committee members will be 
surveyed to determine what they believe the functions of the audit 
committee should be and to determine if they are actually carrying out 
these functions effectively. Each questionnaire will consist of a list 
of possible duties of audit committees that relate to external auditor
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independence and the internal audit function. Each participant will 
be asked to state whether he believes each function should be performed 
by audit committees. Possible responses will range from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree on a scale of one to five. In a separate column, 
he will be asked to state whether he believes his committee is 
currently performing the function effectively. Possible responses will 
be from performed very effectively to not currently performed using 
an interval scale of one to five. The questionnaires to be sent to the 
audit committee members will also seek general information about their 
company and its audit committee. Items such as size of company, size 
of audit committee, length of time audit committee has been in existence 
and number of directors on the committee with audit backgrounds will be 
included.
Questionnaires will also be sent to CPA firm audit partners. 
Basically, their questionnaire will have the same format as the one 
sent to audit committee members. The CPAs will be asked to state their 
extent of agreement with each listed function that should be performed 
by audit committees. They will also be asked in a separate column if 
over one-half of the audit committees with which they are familiar do 
actually perform the functions effectively. Possible responses will 
be the same as described for the questionnaires to be sent to audit 
committee members.
The third group to be surveyed will be financial statement users 
composed of financial analysts and bankers. The questionnaires to the 
financial statement user group will also list the potential audit 
committee functions. This group will be asked to state the extent of
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their agreement as to whether each function should be performed by the 
audit committee.
All groups will be asked to give an opinion on each of the fol­
lowing statements:
If the external auditor could verify the effective 
functioning of the audit committee according to a 
set of pre-established standards, this would be 
desirable and useful information.
The existence of an audit committee enhances the 
credibility and integrity of corporate financial 
reporting.
Possible responses for each statement will be from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree using the interval scale of one to five.
Respondents from all groups will be asked to list any additional 
audit committee functions they think should be performed and make any 
comments in a designated space on the questionnaire. (Sample copies 
of the questionnaires are found in Appendix A).
Projected Results and Conclusions
From the results of this research, conclusions will be drawn 
concerning the importance of audit committees and their future inpact. 
Recommendations will be made as to what the functions of audit commit­
tees should be and the implications of any significant differences of 
opinion among the groups surveyed will be examined. Significant dif­
ferences could indicate misunderstandings of the purpose of audit 
committees and their role in the corporate organization.
This research is limited to opinions expressed only by the three 
groups surveyed. This research is also limited to the audit committee's 
involvement with internal and external audit activities.
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CHAPTER II
The Influence of Certain Historical Events 
on the Development of 
Corporate Audit Committees
With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all its 
listed corporations have audit committees as of June 30, 1978, audit 
committees have become an integral part of the corporate organization 
structure.
The concept of audit committees is not new. Audit committees first 
received major attention in the late 1930's when the SEC and the New 
York Stock Exchange encouraged their establishment as a result of the 
McKesson-Robbins case. In the last ten years there has been a signi­
ficant increase in the number of corporations that have formed audit 
committees.'*' A 1970 survey by R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neuman showed 
that 32 percent of the corporations responding had audit committees, 
while a repeat of the survey in 1976 showed that 87 percent had audit 
2
committees. Congress, the SEC, the AICPA and others have also expressed 
an interest in and support for audit committees. The interest and 
support of these groups, as well as the increasing responsibilities of 
corporate boards of directors, have significantly contributed to the 
increase in the number of audit committees.
Actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission
In 1940, the SEC first recommended the establishment of audit 
committees in Accounting Series Release No. 19. This was issued in 
response to the McKesson-Robbins, Inc. investigation. The release
30
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
31
proposed that, to assure auditor independence, a committee be selected
from non-officer board members to nominate auditors and arrange details
of the engagement.^*
In Accounting Series Release No. 123, issued March 23, 1972, the
SEC stated its long interest in corporate audit committees, and concluded
with the following statement:
"To this end, the Commission, in the light of the 
foregoing historical recital, endorses the estab­
lishment by all publicly-held companies of audit 
committees composed of outside directors and urges 
the business and financial communities and all 
shareholders of such publicly-held companies to 
lend their full and continuing support to the ef­
fective implementation of the above-cited 
recommendations in order to assist in affording the 
greatest possible protection to investors who rely 
upon such statements."4
The stated intention of these recommendations was to impress on the
auditor his responsibilities to investors, particularly the need for
independence.5 The SEC noted in Accounting Series Release No. 126,
issued July 5, 1972, that the existence of an audit committee of the
board of directors, particularly if composed of outside directors, should
also strengthen such independence.^
In 1974, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 165 which,
among other things, added the following provision to Regulation 14A of
the proxy rules:
"If the issuer has an audit or similar committee 
of the board of directors, state the names of 
the members of the committee. If the board of 
directors has no audit or similar committee, so state."7
In recent years, the SEC has strongly endorsed or required, as a 
result of enforcement proceedings, that individual corporations establish
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audit committees. In the matter of National Telephone Coup any, the 
SEC discovered the following facts:
(1) The company faced serious cash flow difficulties.
(2) The company made public disclosures which did not 
disclose problems but which reported high earn­
ings and projections of growth.
(3) Outside directors were aware of the company's 
troubled financial condition and were also 
aware of the optimistic disclosures.
(4) The company had an audit committee of three 
outside directors, but the committee never met.
(5) Outside directors did not take meaningful 
steps to see to it that adequate disclosure 
be made.®
With regard to the audit committee, the SEC concluded:
"Finally, the facts developed during this investiga­
tion demonstrate the need for adequate, regularized 
procedures under the overall supervision of the Board 
to insure that proper disclosures are being made.
Such procedures could include, among other things, 
a functioning audit committee with authority over 
disclosure matters, or any other procedure which 
involves the Board of Directors in a meaningful way 
in the disclosure process. With such procedures, 
the corporation's shareholders and the public should 
be more adequately protected from haphazard or 
fraudulent disclosure."9
The case of SEC v. Killeam resulted in a consent decree in which
the company agreed, among other things, to form an audit committee of
three outside directors. The SEC specifically stated that duties of
the committee would include:
(1) Review the arrangements and scope of the audit 
and the compensation of the auditor.
(2) Review with the independent auditor and the 
company's chief financial officer the company's 
internal accounting controls.
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(3) Review with the auditor the results of the audit,
including -
(a) The auditor's report-
00 The auditor's perception of the company's 
financial and accounting personnel.
00 Cooperation received by the auditor.
(d) Steps to make the audit more efficient.
00 Significant unusual transactions.
(f) Changes in accounting principles.
Cg) Significant adjustments proposed by the 
auditor.
00 Recommendations by the auditor with re­
gard to internal accounting controls.
(4) Inquire concerning deviations from the company's 
code of conduct and periodically review that code.
(5) Meet at least twice a year with the company's 
financial and accounting staff to review internal 
accounting and auditing procedures.
(6) Recommend to the board the retention or discharge 
of the independent auditors.
(7) Review all public releases of financial information.
(8) Review activities of officers and directors in 
dealing with the company.10
The audit committee would also be authorized to conduct investiga­
tions related to carrying out its duties and to approve settlements of 
certain litigation involving the company's officers.11
The SEC underscored the importance it places on an audit committee 
in an enforcement action concerning misleading interim reporting. In 
the case of SEC v. Mattel, Inc.,12 it accepted Mattel's consent to 
establish an audit committee. As a part of the ensuing settlement, the
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court ordered that the company appoint a majority of unaffiliated 
directors and that it establish a financial controls and audit commit­
tee among whose major functions would be a review of financial controls, 
accounting procedures, and financial statements disseminated to the 
public.
In the consent decree arising from SEC v. Lum’s, et al. 3 the 
court, as part of the settlement of the SEC’s allegation of manipulations 
and proxy fraud ordered that a standing audit committee be established. 
The audit committee was to consist of two or more members of the board 
of directors who were not officers or employers of the company and 
whose function would be to review the auditor’s evaluation of internal 
controls and to oversee other required evaluations of casino opera­
tions, personnel, and security.
When submitting its report on its inquiry into the reason for the
Penn Central collapse to a House subcommittee, the SEC noted that:
"The Commission, taking a look at the future, has 
paid increasing attention to the role, the quali­
fications, the responsibilities, and the independence 
of corporate directors, which appear to be called for.
Last month the Commission released a statement endorsing 
the establishment of audit committees composed of 
independent directors. The staff report points up the 
critical importance of the whole subject of the re­
sponsibility of directors, the greater utilization of 
public and independent directors, the professionaliza­
tion of their function, providing staff support for 
directors and judging their performance not on the 
basis of hindsight but on the basis of the reason­
ableness of their judgment in the circumstances and 
at the time it was exercised."14
In 1976, the SEC again underscored its interest in audit committees, 
this time as a means of deterring questionable and illegal corporate 
payments and other practices. In its report to the Senate on "Ques­
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tionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices," the Commission 
wrote:
"Actions to further enhance the creation by public 
corporations of audit committees composed of inde­
pendent directors to worl. with outside auditors 
would serve as a valuable adjunct to these legisla­
tive proposals.
The importance of the role of the board of directors, 
independent audit committees, and independent counsel 
has been illustrated by the Commission’s enforcement 
actions in the area of questionable or illegal corporate 
payments. Significantly, in some of these cases no 
audit committee existed. In others, with a single 
exception, audit committees either operated only 
during a portion of the time when the questionable 
payments were alleged to have been made, or were 
not wholly independent of management. Accordingly, 
the resolution of these proceedings typically has 
involved establishment of a committee comprised of inde­
pendent members of the board of directors, charged to 
conduct a full investigation, utilizing independent legal 
counsel and outside auditors, to conduct the necessary 
detailed inquiries.
The thoroughness and vigor with which these committees 
have conducted their investigations demonstrate the 
importance of enhancing the role of the board of direc­
tors, establishing entirely independent audit commit­
tees as permanent, rather than extraordinary, corporate 
organs and encouraging the board to rely on independent
counsel."15
Acting to further strengthen the independence of auditors, the SEC
in September 1977 proposed a rule to require disclosure in a company's
proxy material of audit fees and services and approval thereof by the
board of directors or its audit committee.1^ The text of the proposal
included the following comments:
"It is desirable for all public companies to have 
audit committees composed of independent direc­
tors and ways are being considered by which such 
committees might be encouraged or required.
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The Commission believes that objectivity and inde­
pendence are enhanced if the auditor deals with an 
audit committee of independent directors or the 
board of directors in determining services and 
fees. In order to provide investors with knowledge 
of whether the board of directors or audit committee 
has approved all services provided by the auditors, 
the Commission proposes to require disclosure of 
whether such approval has taken place."17
In response to the recommendations of the Moss and Metcalf sub­
committees, the SEC urged the AICPA to require audit committees as a 
condition of an. independent audit. Speaking at the AICPA Fifth fictional 
Conference on Current SEC Developments on January 4, 1978, Harold M. 
Williams, Chairman of the SEC, stated:
"The profession must take whatever steps are 
reasonably available to it--such as insist­
ing that their clients maintain audit 
committees--to insure and enhance its 
independence. If the profession is reluctant 
to take steps of that nature voluntarily and 
of its own accord, the Commission will need 
to understand why and how that reluctance can 
be reconciled with a profession which desires 
to maintain the initiative for self-regulation 
and self-discipline.iS
Harold M. Williams commented again on the importance of audit com­
mittees in a paper presented at Carnegie-Mellon University on October 24, 
1979. He stated as follows:
"Audit committees are critical because of the 
fundamental role which the independent auditor 
plays in corporate accountability and the special 
trust which the public places in the auditor’s 
work. With the wide acceptance of the concept of 
the audit committee, the next question which must 
be faced is the definition of the committees' 
responsibilities. At present, many audit commit­
tees are, undoubtedly, not yet working fully 
effectively, and some may serve more to provide 
windowdressing rather than to add substance to 
the accountability process. The development of 
a better consensus as to the minimum responsi-
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bilities of audit committees should be an important 
priority."19
Since the 1940 issuance of Accounting Series Release No. 19, the 
SEC has consistently shown its support of corporate audit committees. 
Through several court cases it has required certain individual corpora­
tions to establish audit committees and has prescribed definite duties 
for them. In addition, Accounting Series Releases Nos. 123 and 165 
addressed the issue of audit committees and further stated the SEC's 
endorsement of these committees.
Actions of the New York Stock Exchange
The first major endorsement for the establishment of audit com­
mittees came from the New York Stock Exchange in 1939, also as a result 
of the McKesson and Robbins case. The Exchange's report stated, . . 
where practicable, the selection of the auditors by a special committee
of the board of directors composed of directors who are not officers of 
20the company appears desirable."
For over twenty years the Exchange lias required all newly listed 
companies to have at least two outside directors. In 1973, the Exchange 
published a 'white paper' which stated that an audit committee "no
21longer represents a coiporate luxury, but has become a necessity."
At the urging of the SEC, on January 6, 1977, the NYSE adopted a
requirement for all listed companies to maintain an audit committee.
It specifically stated:
"Each domestic company with common stock listed 
on the Exchange, as a condition of listing and 
continued listing of its securities on the Ex­
change, shall establish no later than June 30,
1978, and maintain thereafter an audit committee 
comprised solely of directors independent of
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management and free from any relationship that, in 
the opinion of its board of directors, would inter­
fere with the exercise of independent judgment as 
a committee member. Directors who are affiliates 
of the company or officers or employees of the 
company or its subsidiaries would not be qualified 
for audit committee membership."22
Thus, the audit committee became a required part of the coxporate 
organization for all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Actions of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
In July 1967, the AICPA executive committee statement on audit 
committees of board of directors recommended that publicly owned 
corporations appoint audit committees. Specifically, the committee 
stated:
"The executive committee of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants recommends that publicly 
owned corporations appoint committees composed of out­
side directors to nominate the independent auditors 
and to discuss the auditor’s work with them.
Wide adoption of this practice would represent a 
further step in the continuing improvement of corporate 
financial reporting to the investing public. Audit 
committees can be a constructive force in the overall 
review of internal control and financial structure and 
give added assuran.ce to stockholders as to the objec­
tivity of corporate financial statements.
Audit committees can assist their full boards of 
directors in matters involving financial statements 
and control over financial operations. They can also 
strengthen the positions of managements by providing 
assurance that all possible steps have been taken to 
provide independent review of the management's 
financial policies and operation. This is good for 
the company and good for the public."23
In July 1977, the AICPA board of directors again urged the estab­
lishment of audit committees and urged AICPA members to encourage 
corporations to establish audit committees. The board has also asked
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the American Stock Exchange and regional exchanges to adopt audit 
committee requirements similar to the requirement of the New York 
Stock Exchange.24
Report of the Commission on Auditors* Responsibilities. In its 
report issued in January 1978, the Commission on Auditors' Responsi­
bilities (which was established by the AICPA) stated:
"The board of directors, with outside members and 
an audit committee when appropriate, is the best 
vehicle for achieving and maintaining balance in 
the relationship between the independent auditor 
and management. Therefore, the Commission be­
lieves that steps should be taken by boards, 
auditors, and when necessary, by regulatory 
authorities to help assure that boards will ac­
tively exercise this opportunity. Where appro­
priate to the size and circumstances of the 
corporation, board members should include inde­
pendent outsiders, and an audit committee should
be formed."25
Special Committee on Audit Committees. In early 1978, the AICPA 
appointed a Special Committee on Audit Committees to study whether the 
AICPA should require that companies establish audit committees of their 
boards of directors as a condition of an audit by an independent public 
accountant. Under consideration by this special committee were such 
questions as whether audit committees should be required to strengthen 
auditor independence, and should a requirement for audit committees 
specify duties to be performed by the committee.2^
As a supplemental issue, the committee was also asked to consider
whether the independent auditor should be required to be present and
available to answer questions at the annual meeting of stockholders.
While this is. ue is not directly related to audit committees, it does
27involve similar questions of applicability and implementation.
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The special AICPA committee, which was formed in response to con­
gressional and SEC recommendations for requiring corporate audit 
committees, concluded that it was not possible to sustain the consid­
erable burden of identifying the necessity of an audit committee 
requirement. The AICPA reported to the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission that while it continues to support the concept of audit 
committees for publicly owned corporations, it has found no reasonable 
basis for issuing a t eel m e a l  standard requiring their establishment.
The committee pointed out that it does not find audit committees 
necessary for the maintenance of auditor independence or for performance 
of an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
The AICPA committee also stated, however, that it is convinced that 
audit committees can be helpful to both corporate directors and to 
independent auditors.28 In addition, the committee stated that <my 
Institute requirement would be viewed as an intrusion into the area of 
corporate governance and recommended that the accounting profession 
urge other bodies such as the stock exchanges and the National Associa­
tion of Securities Dealers to encourage or require committees for 
2 9publicly held companies.
While the AICPA is unwilling to make the existence of an audit 
committee mandatory before an independent audit can be performed, it 
has consistently shown its support for audit committees. The AICPA's 
expressed belief in the value of the audit committee has contributed 
to their significant increase in number and importance.
Actions of Congress
While the accounting profession, the SEC and the NYSE have advocated
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the audit coiranittee for many years, Congress lias only recently ex­
pressed its interest in the matter. Senate Bill 3379, introduced 
May 5, 1976, by Senators Church, Clark and Pearson in response to the 
publicity involving questionable corporate payments, had as one of its 
requirements that companies establish audit committees made up of 
outside directors. The bill also would have required that outside 
directors constitute at least one-third of the total board membership.^0 
There was, however, no action taken on this bill.
In its 1976 report on an investigation of the Securities and Ex­
change Commission, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Repre­
sentatives (The Moss Committee), was critical of board of directors 
performance in general and specifically noted the desirability of audit 
committees. The following is an excerpt from that report:
"A director must be willing to devote considerable 
time to his important and continuing responsibili­
ties. A director elected because of demonstrated 
expertise should be expected to manifest that ex­
pertise in fulfillment of his responsibilities and 
should be compensated appropriately. The majority 
of the board should be detached from management and 
from any other conflict of interest, e.g., associa­
tion with the company's investment banker or 
coiporate counsel. The board should provide itself 
with an independent staff. A board's key audit 
committee should be comprised of a majority of 
independent directors who adopt rules to govern 
the committee’s proceedings. The audit committee 
should have available to it independent expert 
advisors. Likewise, the nominating committee 
should be comprised of a majority of independent 
directors. Assuring the independence of the 
board and its key auditing and nominating com­
mittees as well as holding directors to profes­
sional standards of performance are critical to 
building an effective system of corporate ac­
countability to protect public investors as well 
as a corporation's customers, suppliers, and 
competitors."31
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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed December 19, 1977.
This Act made recordkeeping and an internal control system for all public
companies a matter of law. Interpreters of this Act have subsequently
suggested that audit committees could provide a vehicle for insuring
that the provisions of the Act are met. For example, Leonard M.
Savoie, CPA, vice-president and controller of Clark Equipment Company,
Buchanan, Michigan, and former executive vice president of the AICPA,
spoke on some of the practical problems of monitoring compliance with
internal accounting control systems under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. Savoie suggested that, to assure compliance, companies institute
special procedures including annually distributing corporate policy
statements and guidelines to all management personnel and authorizing
internal auditors and lawyers to investigate and report to the audit
committee on violations of the conduct guidelines.^ Dennis R. Beres-
ford and James D. Bond, in an article in the Financial Executive stated
that the immediate effect of the internal control provision of the law
will be for management, audit committees, and independent auditors of
public companies involved in international trade to challenge more
rigorously systems of internal control with a broad question similar
to the following:
How does the company’s system of internal con­
trol provide reasonable assurance that an 
illegal foreign payment does not occur?33
The Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (the Metcalf subcommittee)
stated the following in its November 1977 report:
"The subcommittee strongly believes that the 
accounting profession or the SEC should
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immediately require that publicly owned corpora­
tions establish audit committees composed of 
outside directors as a condition for being ac­
cepted as a client by an independent auditor."34
Given this new interest on the part of Congress, a possibility 
looms that new legislation may require boards of directors of all 
publicly held companies to establish and maintain such audit com­
mittees. The principal concern is that such legislation could 
conceivably go or> to establish specific rules and regulations 
governing the responsibilities and performance of audit committees 
and boards of directors in general.35
Increases in Responsibilities of Directors
At least part of the explanation for the suddenly increased 
enthusiasm for coiporate audit committees is the increased aware­
ness of the legal responsibilities of directors. A large number of 
articles in periodical business publications have emphasized the 
increasing scope of director responsibility.36 For example, a 1974 
editorial in Business Week includes the following:
"The Securities § Exchange Commission's 
suit against the old management of the 
bankrupt Penn Central Railroad abruptly 
extends responsibility for corporate mis­
deeds to a broad new area. In effect, the 
SEC is saying that anyone connected with 
the company who was in a position to know 
what was going on and to do something about 
it will be held liable along with those who 
actually committeed the offenses. Applying 
this philosophy to the Penn Central case, 
the SEC did not stop with bringing suit 
against . . . the former president and . . . 
the former top financial officer. It also 
included as defendants three outside 
directors of the company."37
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In an article entitled "The SEC Looks Harder at How Directors 
Act," (Business Week, February 2, 1976), the following comments 
are included:
"Last week's dismissal of Gulf Oil Corporation Chair­
man, Bob R. Dorsey, by the company's board suggests 
that some directors are already worried. Gulf's 
directors reportedly fear that the SEC would hold 
them liable for a failure to act in disciplining 
management implicated in illegal acts.
Even outside directors without knowledge of wrong­
doing may be legally obligated to ferret out the 
facts for themselves. That is the thinst of a 
consent decree that the SEC negotiated last summer 
with Theodore Kheel and John Castellucci, the two 
outside directors of Sterling Homex Corporation when 
insiders were allegedly practicing fraud in hiding 
the company's financial deterioration."
A book review in the April 26, 1976 issue of Business Week
commences with this statement:
"Corporate scandals have become such everyday 
occurrences that they hardly evoke surprise 
anymore, but until a few months ago, at least, 
one question always popped up in their wake: 
where were the directors when the price fixing, 
bribing, or polluting was going on."
Corporate directors, faced with such charges and assertions, can 
scarcely continue in ignorance of their risks and responsibilities. To 
the extent that corporate audit committees are perceived a? a means of 
reducing such risks, they are likely to be a welcome addition to 
corporate practice.^
Because of limitations of time and resources, the board's responsi­
bility is particularly heavy and, in recent years, directors have been 
facing intensifying challenges:
(1) Companies have increased in size, diversity 
and complexity.
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(2) Directors find it virtually inpossible to 
be knowledgeable about and discuss every 
facet of their directorate companies.
(3) The number of lawsuits against directors 
has increased, not only because of board 
actions but also because of actions by 
management.
(4) The directors' obligation to exercise 
reasonable care in the fulfillment of 
their responsibilities to shareholders 
is underscored by the trend toward 
litigation.3y
Corporate boards of directors must meet the challenges of their 
changing duties and responsibilities in order to fulfill their role 
within the corporate organization. The audit committee can be an 
important aid in this endeavor.
Other Actions Supporting the Establislmient of Audit Committees
The Corporate Director's Guidebook, prepared by a subcommittee of 
the American Bar Association, states that it is desirable that boards 
of directors establish audit committees. The audit committee is 
described in this publication as "the communication link between the 
board of directors as representatives of the stockholders, on the one 
hand, and the independent auditors on the other hand." 40
Some states have audit committee requirements. For example, a 
recently enacted statute of Connecticut requires that certain coipora- 
tions of that state with at least one hundred stockholders must 
establish audit committees. 41 -
In Canada, the provisions of the Business Corporations Act in­
clude the following:
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(1) The directors of a corporation that is 
offering its securities to the public 
shall elect annually from among their 
number a committee to be known as the 
audit committee to be composed of not 
fewer than three directors, of whom,
a majority shall not be officers or 
employees of the coiporation or an 
affiliate of the corporation, to hold 
office until the next annual meeting 
of the shareholders.
(2) The members of the audit committee shall 
elect a chairman from among their mem­
bers.
(3) The corporation shall submit the finan­
cial statement to the audit committee 
for its review and the financial state­
ment shall thereafter be submitted to 
the board of directors.
(4) The auditor has the right to appear be­
fore and be heard at any meeting of the 
audit committee and shall appear before 
the audit committee when required to do 
so by the committee.
(5) Upon the request of the auditor, the 
chairman of the audit committee shall 
convene a meeting of the committee to 
consider any matters the auditor believes 
should be brought to the attention of the 
directors or shareholders. 42
Many segments of the business community and the general public 
have shown interest in and support for corporate audit committees. 
These segments may differ in the purposes for which they support audit 
committees and in the objectives they hope will be achieved. However, 
a historical review of the development of audit committees shows that 
all interested segments expect the committees to strengthen the 
corporate image to the general public.
While the composition of audit committees has been addressed by
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the SEC, the NYSE, the AICPA and Congress, only the SEC has issued any 
specific duties to be performed by audit committees, and this has only 
been done in specific cases for Individual companies. Without guide­
lines to maintain some consistency and standardization of functions 
and responsibilities for all audit committees, the goals for which 
these bodies support corporate audit committees may not be achieved.
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CHAPTER III
Research Methodology and 
Analysis of Results
Enthusiasm and support for audit committees are widespread.
Since audit committees have shown such tremendous growth in numbers 
and importance in recent years, a definition of their role within 
the corporation has been a source of concern. The objectives and 
functions of audit committees are not clearly identified in many 
cases. As a result, various segments of the business community may 
differ in their expectation of the contribution that audit, committees 
should make toward improving corporate accountability. Before the 
gap in expectations can be narrowed, differences in perceptions must 
be identified.
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial 
statement users have different perceptions about the role of corporate 
audit committees and their functions. These particular groups were 
selected for participation in this research because of the difference 
in their relation to audit committees and to corporations in general.
A random sample of 447 CPA firm audit partners selected from 
the eight largest public accounting firms in the country, 376 audit 
committee members selected from the annual reports of U. S. corpora­
tions, and 450 financial statement users were included in the survey. 
The financial statement user group was composed of bankers selected 
from Polk’s World Bank Directory and financial analysts selected
51
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from the 1979 membership directory of the African Financial Analysts 
Federation. The sample size for each group was originally 500 par­
ticipants. However, when those participants with insufficient 
addresses were eliminated the preceding sample sizes resulted.
Mail questionnaires were pre-tested by surveying twenty addi­
tional participants. Nine questionnaires or 45% were returned with 
no indication of any problems in understanding or completing the 
questionnaire. Questionnaires were then sent to all survey partici­
pants and usable responses were as follows: 159 or 35.6% from CPA
firm audit partners; 67 or 18% from audit committee members; and 
122 or 27.1% from financial statement users.
Test for Nonresponse Bias
Any survey bears an element of risk due to the opinions of 
nonrespondents. The Hansen-Hurwitz method was followed to test for 
the effect of nonresponse bias on this questionnaire survey.1 The 
following steps were performed:
(1) A subsample of possible nonrespondents was 
selected at random from the sample popula­
tion of each group surveyed.
(2) These possible nonrespondents were contacted 
as follows: telephone calls to CPAs and
financial statement users, and registered 
letters to audit committee members.
(3) Questionnaires from the nonrespondents were 
compared with an equal number of question­
naires randomly selected from the original 
respondents.
The El-Badry technique modified the Hansen-Hurwitz method by 
recommending that successive waves of questionnaires be sent to survey
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participants in order to achieve a high initial mail response before 
2
identifying nonrespondents. For this research, two successive waves 
were mailed. The second request was mailed to all survey participants 
with the exception of those whose original questionnaires were returned 
as undeliverable by the post office.
After these two successive mailings, the personal contact pro­
cedure was used. This contact procedure produced responses from 11 
CPAs, 7 audit committee members, and 9 financial statement users. An 
equivalent number of original respondents were randomly selected for 
comparison.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distributional differences was 
used to compare questionnaires of the nonrespondents and the respond­
ents. The test was done for each function between pairs of groups.
In no case were any statistically significant differences in responses 
noted. Results of the nonresponse bias test can be found in Appendix 
B.
Selection of Statistical Test for Survey Data
Parametric and nonparametric statistics were considered in deciding 
which statistical test was most appropriate to use in determining if 
there were significant differences in the responses of the groups 
surveyed.
Parametric statistics were considered first. An assumption of 
parametric statistics is that the observations are drawn from a normally 
distributed population. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic was used 
to test for normality of responses for each function within each group.
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic is a test of goodness of fit and
3
is more powerful than the chi-square goodness of fit test. The 
results showed that at P - .01, none of the responses were normally 
distributed. Therefore, parametric statistics could not be used.
The nonparametric chi-square test was first selected for use to 
determine the significance of differences among independent groups. 
However, the data showed a high number of contingency tables where 
more than 5 % of the cells had expected counts of less than five.
Since extensive collapsing of responses would have been necessary,4 
the chi-square test may not have been valid.
Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was selected for use to test 
for distributional differences. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample 
test is a test of whether two independent samples have been drawn from 
the same population or from populations with the same distribution.
The two-tailed test is sensitive to any kind of difference in the 
distribution from which the two samples were drawn, such as differences 
in location (central tendency), in dispersion, or in skewness. The 
test is concerned with the agreement between two sets of sample 
values.̂
If the two samples have in fact been drawn from the same popula­
tion distribution, then the cumulative distribution of both samples 
may be expected to be fairly close to each other, inasmuch as they 
both should show only random deviations from the population distribu­
tion. If the two sample cumulative distributions are too far apart 
at any point, this suggests that the samples come from different 
populations.^
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Pairwise comparisons were made in all cases. Therefore, for 
each function and the two opinion statements, the following hypothesis 
was tested:
H: There is no significant difference between the 
distribution of group responses.
Questionnaire Data on Performance of Audit Committee Functions
Questionnaires sent to respondents in each of the three groups 
contained a list of seven external auditor independence related 
functions and eight internal audit related functions. The listed 
functions were limited to these two categories although audit com­
mittees can and probably do perform duties in other areas. Auditor 
independence and internal audit, however, represent the main thrust 
of their activities as evidenced by the literature. The functions 
were also limited because if functions related to external auditor 
independence and internal audit are properly and effectively per­
formed, the need for additional functions may be lessened. The 
listed functions were determined from a combination of functions 
suggested by sources such as the SEC, the Metcalf Report and journal 
articles. The functions included in the questionnaires were:
(1) External Auditor Independence Related
(a) Discuss with independent auditors their 
experiences and problems in completing 
the audit
(b) Discuss scope and timing of independent 
audit work
(c) Approve or nominate independent auditors
(d) Discuss meaning and significance of audited 
figures and notes thereto
(e) Recommend termination of external auditors 
when necessary
(f) Ascertain whether management has taken
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proper action on independent auditor 
recommendations
(g) Consult with the independent auditors (out 
of the presence of management) with regard 
to the adequacy of internal controls.
(2) Internal Audit Related
(a) Discuss effectiveness of internal control 
with the internal auditors
(b) Discuss organization and independence of 
internal auditors
(c) Evaluate the adequacy of staffing for 
internal auditing
(d) Discuss internal audit findings and 
recommendations with internal auditors
(e) Discuss goals and plans, including nature 
and extent of work, of the internal audit 
function
(f) Discuss with internal auditors their ex­
periences and problems in completing 
audits
(g) Ascertain whether management has taken 
proper action on the internal auditors' 
recommendations
(h) Consult with internal auditors (out of 
the presence of management) with regard 
to the adequacy of internal controls.
CPAs and audit committee members were asked to express their 
opinion on how well the audit committees, with which they are familiar, 
perform each function. CPAs, audit committee members and financial 
statement users were also asked to state their extent of agreement 
with the desirability of each function that could be performed by 
audit committees.
Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners and Audit Committee 
Members Concerning Current Audit Committee Performance of External 
Auditor Independence Related Function's
The opinions of CPA firm audit partners and audit committee members
were significantly different for all seven of the external auditor
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independence related functions at P < .05. A summary of responses is 
shorn in Tables 1 and 2.
Discuss With Independent Auditors Their Experiences and Problems 
in Completing the Audit. CPA firm audit partners thought that the 
audit committees with which they were familiar adequately discussed 
experiences and problems in completing the audit with the independent 
auditor. The responses of the CPAs were about evenly distributed 
between performed very effectively and performed effectively (31% and 
36%, respectively). Audit committee members tended to believe much 
more strongly that they were effectively performing this function.
An overwhelming majority of the audit committee members (87%) indi­
cated a belief that they were very effectively discussing experiences 
and problems of the audit with the independent auditor. Both groups 
agreed that effective discussions between independent auditors and 
audit committees are being held, although the difference in degree 
of effectiveness is statistically significant.
Discuss Scope and Timing of Independent Audit Work. The majority 
of audit committee members (72%) indicated that they believe their 
audit committee is very effectively discussing the scope and timing 
of the independent audit work. CPAs indicated that they believe 
effective discussions are being held by audit committees concerning 
scope and timing of independent audit work although the degree of 
effectiveness indicated was significantly different from that ex­
pressed by audit committee members. The responses of CPAs indicated 
that only 33% believe this function to be very effectively performed
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TABLE 1
DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH 
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS 
EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION? 
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
31 36 21 7 5
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 33 39 20 5 3
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 55 25 11 4 5
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
22 25 35 14 4
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary
24 17 21 15 23
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
29 42 20 6 3
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
41 35 13 6 5
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS EXTERNAL 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION? 
RESPONSES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
87 9 3 0 1
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 72 13 10 2 3
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 76 7 7 0 10
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
66 18 9 3 4
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary
69 8 3 6 14
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
72 15 9 3 1
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
85 9 2 0 4
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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and 391 believe it to be effectively performed.
Approve or Nominate Independent Auditors. General agreement was 
indicated between CPAs and audit committee members that audit committees 
effectively approve and nominate the independent auditors. The de­
gree of effectiveness indicated by the two groups caused a statis­
tically significant difference in responses although the majority of 
both groups expressed an opinion that this function is very effectively 
performed (551 of the CPAs and 761 of the audit committee members).
Discuss Meaning and Significance of Audited Figures and Notes 
Thereto. The difference of opinion between CPAs and audit committee 
members as to whether adequate discussions are held concerning the 
meaning and significance of audited figures and notes thereto was 
statistically significant. While 66% of the audit committee members 
indicated that they believe this function is very effectively per­
formed, a large percentage of the CPAs (35%) indicated average 
performance. Very few of the audit committee members (3%) thought 
discussions were ineffective. However, 14% of the CPAs indicated 
that they believe this function is ineffectively performed by audit 
committees.
Recommend Termination of External Auditors When Necessary. Responses 
to this function varied significantly between groups. The opinions of 
CPAs were widely distributed with 24% indicating a belief that audit 
committees very effectively recommend termination of external auditors 
when necessary, and 23% indicating average performance of this function.
A majority of audit committee members (69%) expressed a belief that 
their committee very effectively performs this function. A large
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percentage of both groups, however, indicated that the audit committees 
with which they are familiar do not perform this function (231 of 
CPAs and 14% of audit committee members). Since the performance of 
this function would only be necessary in special circumstances, many 
of the survey respondents may not have encountered an actual situa­
tion where the audit committee recommended termination of the auditors. 
Therefore, responses may be based on planned instead of actual per­
formance and this may partially account for some of the responses.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on Inde­
pendent Auditor Recommendations. CPAs and audit committee members 
agreed that audit committees effectively ascertained whether management 
had taken proper action on independent auditor recommendations. The 
difference in degree of effectiveness indicated was significant 
between groups, however. A majority of the audit committee members 
(72%) expressed a belief that their committee was very effectively 
performing this function, CPAs were clearly less enthusiastic about 
the degree of effectiveness with only 29% indicating a belief that 
audit committees were very effective in the performance of this 
function.
Consult With the Independent Auditors (Out of the Presence of 
Management) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls. Both 
groups indicated a belief that the audit committee effectively con­
sults with the independent auditor with regard to the adequacy of 
internal controls. A majority of audit committee members (85%) 
expressed a belief that this function is very effectively performed 
as compared to 41% of the CPAs. Differences in degree of opinion
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caused a statistically significant difference in responses.
Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners and Audit Committee 
Members Concerning Current Audit Committee Performance of Internal 
Audit Related Functions
For all of the eight internal audit related functions the dis­
tributions of responses were significantly different at P - .05.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize these responses.
Discuss Effectiveness of Internal Control With the Internal 
Auditors. Responses of the two groups varied significantly with re­
gard to the effectiveness of discussions between audit committees 
and internal auditors concerning internal control. The majority of 
CPAs (50%) indicated that they believe this function is effectively 
performed; however, a substantial percentage (29%) were uncertain, 
and 21% expressed a belief that this function was ineffectively 
performed. Audit committee members indicated a belief that the function 
is performed effectively with 69% indicating very effective performance. 
Only 6% of the audit committee members indicated a belief that this 
function is ineffectively performed.
Discuss Organization and Independence of Internal Auditors. The 
responses of CPAs to the effectiveness with which audit committees 
discuss the organization and independence of internal auditors varied 
widely. While most of the CPAs indicated a belief that this function 
is effectively performed, 15% expressed doubt as to audit committee 
effectiveness in performing this function. Audit committee members 
indicated a much stronger belief that audit committees were effective­
ly discussing the organization and independence of internal auditors.
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TABLE 3
DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH 
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS 
INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
17 33 29 13 8
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
18 27 31 15 9
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
10 16 41 18 15
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommen­
dations with internal 
auditors
16 32 29 16 7
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and 
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function
10 28 41 17 4
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
audits
6 23 38 20 13
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on the internal 
auditors' recommendations
13 32 33 18 4
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of the 
presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
16 19 23 22 20
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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TABLE 4
DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS INTERNAL 
AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF AUDIT CCM4ITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
69 18 7 2 4
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
64 12 13 6 5
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
52 19 13 10 6
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommen­
dations with internal 
auditors
69 15 7 3 6
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and 
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function
60 18 12 4 6
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
audits
58 14 13 7 8
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on the internal 
auditors' recommendations
62 19 6 7 6
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of the 
presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
63 12 6 6 13
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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Of the responding audit committee members, 641 indicated a belief 
that this function is performed very effectively.
Evaluate the Adequacy of Staffing for Internal Auditing. Disagree­
ment between groups concerning the effectiveness of audit committee 
evaluation of the adequacy of staffing for internal auditing was 
substantial. Only 101 of the CPAs expressed a belief that this function 
is very effectively performed compared to 521 of the audit committee 
members. In addition, 15% of the CPAs indicated that audit committees 
with which they are familiar do not currently evaluate the adequacy 
of internal audit staffing. Only 61 of the audit committee members 
indicated that their committee does not currently perform this func­
tion.
Discuss Internal Audit Findings and Recommendations With Internal 
Auditors. The responses of both groups tended to indicate that 
they believe audit committees do effectively discuss internal audit 
findings with internal auditors. Audit committee members, however, 
indicated much greater confidence in the effectiveness with which 
this function is performed. Sixty-nine percent of the audit committee 
members expressed a belief that this function is very effectively 
performed compared to only 161 of the CPAs.
Discuss Goals and Plans, Including Nature and Extent of Work, 
of the Internal Audit Function. Audit committee members expressed 
a belief that audit committees effectively discuss goals and plans 
of the internal audit function. CPAs indicated a similar belief but 
to a significantly less degree. Only 101 of the CPAs indicated a 
belief that this function is very effectively performed as compared
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to 601 of the audit committee members.
Discuss With Internal Auditors Their Experiences and Problems 
in Completing Audits. The degree of effectiveness indicated by CPAs 
and audit committee members varied significantly. A majority of 
audit committee members (58%) expressed a belief that audit committees 
very effectively hold discussions with internal auditors concerning 
experiences and problems arising from the internal audit process. Only 
6% of the CPAs indicated such a strong belief. Responses from both 
groups indicated that this function is not performed at all in a 
substantial number of cases. Thirteen percent of the CPAs and 8% of 
the audit committee members indicated that discussions between audit 
committees and internal auditors were not held by the committees 
with which they are associated.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on the 
Internal Auditors' Recommendations. Audit committee members indicated 
much more strongly than CPAs that they believe audit committees ef­
fectively ascertain whether management has taken proper action on the 
recommendations of internal auditors. Thirteen percent and 62% of the 
CPAs and audit committee members, respectively, indicated a belief 
that this function is very effectively performed.
Consult With Internal Auditors (Out of the Presence of Manage­
ment) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls. A majority 
of audit committee members (63%) indicated a belief that discussions 
between audit committees and internal auditors with regard to internal 
controls were very effective. CPAs, however, indicated that they 
believe the performance of this function is only somewhat effective.
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In addition, both CPAs and audit committee members indicated that 
this function is not performed by audit committees in many cases.
Of the respondents, 20% of the CPAs and 13% of the audit committee 
members indicated that the committees with which they are familiar do 
not perform this function.
There is an obvious gap in perceived audit committee effective­
ness between the responding CPA firm audit partners and audit committee 
members. Predictably, audit committee members expressed more confidence 
in the effectiveness of their performance than did CPAs. Assuming 
the committee is made up of dedicated and conscientious individuals, 
the expectation is that they will perform their duties to the best of 
their ability. The difference of opinion expressed by the CPAs, 
however, suggests that the aduit committee members may not fully 
understand the functions they are attempting to perform.
Another possible reason for the gap in perceived effectiveness 
between CPAs and audit committee members is that CPAs as a whole may 
be referring to firms of a smaller size than the audit committee 
members. All CPAs in the survey are audit partners but they may have 
been associated with more smaller regional firms than with larger 
national corporations from which audit committee members were selected. 
For purposes of this research, however, the assumption is that dif­
ferences in the size of firms referred to by CPAs and audit committee 
members are not large enough to affect the survey results.
The survey results also showed that both CPAs and audit committee 
members are of the opinion that the listed audit committee functions 
related to external auditor independence are performed much more
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effectively than those functions related to internal audit. Audit 
committees may believe that their most important work is with the 
external auditor.
Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners, Audit Committee 
Members and Financial Statement Users Concerning the Desirability of 
Audit Committee Performance of Certain External Auditor Independence' 
Related Functions" "
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 summarize the responses of the three groups 
surveyed regarding their opinions of the desirability of audit com­
mittee performance of certain external auditor independence related 
functions. Statistically significant differences were noted in many 
cases.
Discuss With Independent Auditors Their Experiences and Problems 
in Completing the Audit. All groups agreed that the audit committee 
should have discussions with external auditors regarding experiences 
and problems in completing the audit. A statistically significant 
difference in responses was noted, however, because CPA firm audit 
partners and audit committee members expressed a stronger degree of 
agreement than financial statement users.
Discuss Scope and Timing of Independent Audit Work. All three 
groups indicated a belief that audit committees should discuss the 
scope and timing of audit work. Degree of agreement varied substan­
tially, however. Only 461 of the financial statement users expressed 
strong agreement as compared to 66% and 81% of the CPAs and audit 
committee members, respectively.
Approve or Nominate Independent Auditors. The approval or 
nomination of independent auditors was considered to be a desirable
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TABLE 5
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD 
BE PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
82 12 3 1 2
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 66 26 4 2 2
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 78 14 5 2 1
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
58 29 8 2 3
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary
62 17 16 2 3
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
78 17 3 1 1
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
75 17 0 2 6
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
96 2 0 0 2
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 80 9 9 0 2
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 77 11 5 0 7
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
82 9 4 1 4
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary
79 11 5 0 5
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
84 13 2 0 1
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
90 4 2 0 4
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 
5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 7
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
64 23 6 4 3
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 46 25 19 6 4
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 50 17 15 10 8
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
60 24 9 3 4
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary
55 21 12 5 7
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
64 25 7 1 3
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
70 16 9 2 3
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree 
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree=
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TABLE 8
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE PERFORMING 
THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION? 












Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in couple ting 
the audit
NS** .05 .05
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work NS .05 .05
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors NS .05 .05
Discuss meaning and 
significance of audited 
figures and notes thereto
.05 NS .05
Recommend termination of 




ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
NS NS NS
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of manage­
ment) with regard to the 
adequacy of internal 
controls NS NS NS
The hypothesis is that the distribution of group responses is not 
significantly different.
**
NS = Not Significant.
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audit committee function by all groups. Financial statement users 
indicated lesser agreement than CPAs and audit commi_tse members, 
however. CPAs and audit committee members strongly agreed with the 
performance of this function in 78% and 77% of the responses respec­
tively, as compared to 50% of the financial statement users.
Discuss Meaning and Significance of Audited Figures and Notes 
Thereto. All groups supported discussions of the meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures and notes thereto as an audit committee 
function. However, audit committee members, with 82% expressing 
strong agreement, attached more importance to the performance of this 
function than CPAs and financial statement users. Strong agreement 
for performance of this function was indicated by only 58% of the 
CPAs and 60% of the financial statement users.
Recommend Termination of External Auditors When Necessary. 
Financial statement users indicated a lesser degree of agreement (55% 
expressed strong agreement) to audit committees recommending termina­
tion of external auditors when necessary. CPAs and audit committee 
members expressed stronger support for audit committee performance 
of this function, with 62% of the CPAs and 79% of the committee 
members responding in strong agreement.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on Inde­
pendent Auditor Recommendations. The majority of all groups strongly 
agreed that audit committees should ascertain whether management has 
taken proper action on independent auditor recommendations. No sig­
nificant differences in responses were noted.
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Consult With the Independent Auditors (Out of the Presence of 
Management) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls). A 
majority of all three groups were strongly in favor of consultations 
between audit committees and the independent auditor with regard to 
the adequacy of internal controls. Any differences in the distribution 
of responses were statistically insignificant.
Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners, Audit Committee 
Members and Financial Statement Users Concerning the Desirability of 
Audit Committee Performance of Certain Internal Audit Related Functions
Degree of support for the performance of certain audit committee 
functions related to internal audit varied significantly among the 
responding groups. Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 summarize the survey re­
sults .
Discuss Effectiveness of Internal Control With the Internal 
Auditors. Discussions between audit committees and internal auditors 
on the effectiveness of internal control were considered important by 
all three groups. A majority of all groups agreed that this function 
should be performed by audit committees. A statistically significant 
difference resulted, however, because a much smaller percentage of 
financial statement users indicated strong agreement than CPAs and 
audit committee members. Only 56% of the financial statement users 
expressed strong agreement conpared to 67% and 87% of the CPAs and 
committee members, respectively.
Discuss Organization and Independence of Internal Auditors. All 
groups indicated agreement that audit committees should discuss the 
organization and independence of internal auditors although degree of
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
67 28 4 0 1
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
68 22 7 1 2
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
44 30 17 5 4
Discuss internal audit find­
ings and recommendations 
with internal auditors
61 30 6 2 1
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and ex­
tent of work, of the 
internal audit function
53 29 15 2 1
Discuss with internal auditors 
their experiences and problems 
in coupleting audits
39 33 17 8 3
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on the 
internal auditors' recommenda­
tions
64 28 6 0 2
Consult with internal auditors 
(out of presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy of 
internal controls
48 30 11 3 8
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
RESPONSES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
85 13 0 0 2
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
71 18 9 0 2
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
63 23 8 2 4
Discuss internal audit 
findings ana recommenda­
tions with internal 
auditors
73 14 9 2 2
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and extent 
of work, of the internal audit 
functions
68 18 5 7 2
Discuss with internal audi­
tors their experiences and 
problems in completing 
audits
64 23 7 4 2
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper action 
on the internal auditors' 
recommendations
77 14 2 2 4
Consult with internal audi­
tors (out of presence of the 
management) with regard to 
the adequacy of internal 
controls
72 7 11 4 6
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
RESPONSES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Function 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
56 26 9 5 4
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
38 34 21 5 2
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
29 27 26 10 8
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommenda­
tions with internal auditors
44 26 22 6 2
Discuss goals and plans, in­
cluding nature and extent of 
work, of the internal audit 
function
38 27 26 6 3
Discuss with internal auditors 
their experiences and problems 
in completing audits
40 31 20 7 2
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on 
the internal auditors' recom­
mendations
55 28 10 5 2
Consult with internal audi­
tors (out of presence of 
management) with regard to 
adequacy of internal controls
48 26 16 5 5
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 12
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE PERFORMING 
THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?












Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with 
the internal auditors
NS** NS .05
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
NS .05 .05
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
NS .05 .05
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommenda­
tions with internal 
auditors
NS .05 .05
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and extent 
of work, of the internal 
audit function
NS .05 .05
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experi­




ment has taken proper 
action on the internal 
auditors5 recommendations
NS NS .05
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of presence 
of management) with re­
gard to the adequacy of 
internal controls
.05 NS .05
The hypothesis is that the distribution of group responses is not 
significantly different.
NS = Not Significant.
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agreement varied widely. CPAs and audit committee members were in 
support of this function with 68% of the CPAs and 71% of the committee 
members indicating strong agreement. The degree of agreement expressed 
by financial statement users was significantly less. Only 38% of the 
user gioup was in strong agreement with audit committee performance 
of this function. In addition, uncertainty as to whether this function 
should be performed by audit committees was indicated by 21% of the 
statement users.
Evaluate the Adequacy of Staffing for Internal Auditing. Uniform 
agreement was expressed by the three groups surveyed that audit com­
mittees should evaluate the adequacy of staffing for internal auditing. 
Financial statement users, however, indicated a lesser degree of 
agreement than CPAs and audit committee members. The percentage of 
statement users indicating strong agreement was 29% compared to 44% 
of the CPAs and 63% of the audit committee members. Also, 26% of the 
financial statement users and 17% of the CPAs indicated uncertainty 
as to whether this function should be performed at all.
Discuss Internal Audit Findings and Recommendations With External 
Auditors. Financial statement users expressed a lesser degree of 
agreement than CPAs and audit committee members in regard to discus­
sions of internal audit findings and recommendations between audit 
committees and internal auditors. All groups did agree that this 
function should be performed by audit committees, but only 44% of the 
statement users were in strong agreement, whereas 61% of the CPAs and 
73% of the audit committee members expressed strong agreement. Also 
contributing to a statistically significant difference in the group
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responses was the fact that 22% of the financial statement users indi­
cated that they were uncertain as to the desirability of audit 
committee performance of this function.
Discuss Goals and Plans, Including Nature and Extent of Work, 
of the Internal Audit Function. The three groups agreed that audit 
committees should discuss goals, plans, nature and extent of work of 
the internal audit function. Financial statement users were less 
enthusiastic in their support of this function than the other two 
groups. Also, 261 of the financial statement users and 15% of the 
CPAs were unsure of whether this should be an audit committee function.
Discuss With Internal Auditors Their Experiences and Problems 
in Coupleting Audits. All groups agreed that audit committees should 
discuss with internal auditors any problems and experiences in com­
pleting internal audits. Audit committee members, however, indicated 
much greater agreement in that 64% of the respondents in this group 
expressed strong agreement with the performance of this function.
Only 39% of the CPAs and 40% of the financial statement users indi­
cated strong agreement. In addition, 20% of the statement users and 
17% of the CPAs expressed uncertainty as to whether audit committees 
should perform this function.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on the 
Internal Auditors' Recommendations. A majority of all groups agreed 
that audit committees should ascertain whether management has taken 
proper action on the internal auditors' recommendations. A statis­
tically significant difference in responses was caused by a lesser 
degree of agreement expressed by financial statement users rather
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than any disagreement among groups.
Consult With Internal Auditors (Out of the Presence of Manage­
ment) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls. Audit committee 
members indicated much stronger support for audit committees per­
formance of this function although CPAs and financial statement users 
agreed that audit committees should consult with internal auditors 
about internal controls. In 721 of the responses, audit committee 
members strongly agreed that this function should be performed. Only 
48% of the CPAs and 48% of the statement users expressed such strong 
agreement.
Several pervading perceptions concerning potential audit commit­
tee functions were identified by the survey results. First, financial 
statement users consistently indicated less support for audit com­
mittee performance of the functions presented than the other two groups. 
Alternatively, audit committee members expressed consistently 
stronger support for the functions presented.
Secondly, survey results indicated that financial statement users 
are less sure of desirable audit committee functions, particularly 
those functions related to internal audit. For 5 of the 8 internal 
audit related functions presented to survey participants for con­
sideration, financial statement users expressed uncertainty in 20% or 
more of their responses.
Finally, all groups placed less importance on audit committee 
performance of internal audit related functions. The percentage of 
respondents strongly agreeing with the desirability of audit committee 
performance of the external auditor independence related functions was
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greater for all three groups.
Questionnaire Data and Comparison of Group Perceptions of the Role of 
Audit Committees
Respondents in each of the three groups were asked to give their 
opinion on the following two statements:
(1) If the external auditor could verify the 
effective functioning of the audit commit­
tee according to a set of pre-established 
standards, this would be desirable and 
useful information.
(2) The existence of an audit committee en­
hances the credibility and integrity of 
corporate financial reporting.
Responses to these statements give an indication of how the three
groups perceive the role of audit committees and its importance to
the corporate organization. Opinions were measured on a 1 to 5
scale, with 1 indicating strong agreement and 5 indicating strong
disagreement. Actual responses indicate differing opinions among
groups to the statements. A summary of these responses is shown in
Tables 13 and 14.
External Auditor Verification of Audit Committee Effectiveness. 
Audit committee members and financial statement users felt that ex­
ternal auditor verification of the effective functioning of audit 
committees could provide desirable and useful information, even 
though their support was not very strong. A majority of CPAs (641), 
however, disagreed and did not believe in the importance of external 
auditor verification, with a large percentage (441) in strong disagree­
ment.
A possibility exists here that CPAs are in disagreement because




















AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING 
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS, AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
If the external auditor could 
verify the effective function­
ing of the audit committee 
according to a set of pre- 
established standards, this 
would be desirable and useful 
information
The existence of an audit 
committee enhances the 
credibility and integrity 








28 36 20 10
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 14













If the external auditor 
could verify the effec­
tive functioning of the 
audit committee according 
to a set of pre-estab­
lished standards,this would 
be desirable and useful in­
formation
.05 .05 NS**
The existence of an audit 
committee enhances the 
credibility and integrity 
of corporate financial 
reporting
.05 NS .05
*The hypothesis is that the distribution of group responses is not 
significantly different.
NS = Not Significant.
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they do not want the responsibility of evaluating audit committee 
effectiveness. This may be particularly true at this stage of audit 
committee development since roles and responsibilities vary between 
companies. Also, any evaluation of audit committee responsibility 
may involve subjective judgment by the CPA. Generally, CPAs find 
objective judgment preferable and therefore may deem additional re­
sponsibility of a subjective nature undesirable.
Audit Committee Effect on Credibility and Integrity of Corporate 
Financial Reporting. All groups agreed that the existence of an audit 
committee enhances the credibility and integrity of corporate finan­
cial reporting. Audit committee members felt much more strongly about 
the impact of the audit committee on financial reporting than did CPAs 
or financial statement users. Such an opinion on the part of audit 
committee members could encourage them toward more diligent and effec­
tive performance. Additionally, audit committees may currently be 
assuming more responsibility and becoming more involved in corporate 
affairs than CPAs or financial statement users are aware of.
Comments and Additional Audit Committee Functions Suggested by Survey 
Respondents
Each survey respondent was asked to list any additional functions 
that he felt audit committees should perform and make any related 
comments. This additional information has been grouped under the 
following general subjects: external audit fees, external auditor
performance of non-audit services, company compliance with laws and 
regulatory agencies, management-related matters, accounting policies 
and reporting procedures, and other matters.
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External Audit Fees. Six percent of the responding CPAs stated 
that they were in favor of some type of audit committee involvement 
in external audit fee-related matters. The specific types of involve­
ment suggested were not uniform. Some CPAs said the audit committee 
should set or approve audit fees, while others felt that the audit 
committee should only be informed of the fee. Others suggested an 
evaluation of fees with regard to fairness for company size and com­
plexity of work performed. None of the financial statement users or 
audit committee members had any comments concerning external audit 
fees.
External Auditor Performance of Non-Audit Services. Comments 
from 3 CPAs and 1 financial statement user reflected an opinion that 
the audit committee should review non-audit services performed by 
external auditors. Suggestions were made for inquiries to determine 
the extent of non-audit services, the effect of these services on 
external auditor independence and the cost of these services.
Compliance With Laws and Regulatory Agencies. Four CPAs and 
three audit committee members stated that audit committees should 
investigate and monitor company compliance with appropriate laws and 
regulatory bodies. Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Internal 
Revenue Service, and the Federal Trade Commission were specifically 
mentioned. One respondent (CPA) also mentioned that the audit commit­
tee could become involved with evaluating and monitoring corporate 
morals and social responsibility and an audit committee member sug­
gested the committee aid in establishing the ethical character of the
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company.
Management-Related Matters. Respondents from each surveyed 
group stated that audit committees should inquire into and evaluate 
management characteristics and activities. Specifically, 10 CPAs, 2 
audit committee members and 2 financial statement users made the 
following suggestions:
Cl) Evaluate qualifications of top management
and financial personnel.
(2) Review the salaries of officers.
(3) Review the fringe benefits of officers.
(4) Review expenses of top management.
(5) Investigate or arrange investigation when 
the integrity of a senior executive comes 
under question.
(6) Inquire of independent CPA about the co­
operation of management
(7) Determine and investigate any scope limita­
tions placed on the independent audit by 
management.
While supporting an audit committee role in overseeing and 
monitoring management activities, several respondents warned against 
excessive committee involvement with management. The audit committee, 
as a subcommittee of the board of directors, should be a separate 
unit from management and overlapping of responsibilities should be 
minimal. Comments from 2 financial statement users, however, ex­
pressed a concern that the audit committee could become a rubber stamp 
for management. This threat is more serious if an audit committee is 
unsure of its role, responsibilities and functions.
Accounting Policies and Reporting Procedures. Ten CPA firm audit
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partners, three financial statement users, and one audit committee 
member supported evaluation and/or review of significant accounting 
policies and reporting practices. Specifically mentioned were a
review of an accounting procedure used where alternatives were ac­
ceptable, review of the annual report and review of unaudited interim 
financial data.
Other Matters. Other suggestions from the three groups of re­
spondents included a review of matters pending at the SEC, Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, th,e AICPA or elsewhere that may have a 
significant impact on the coup any.
Two audit committee members also mentioned that the audit committee 
should be involved in the investigation of questionable or illegal 
payments and bribery of political or financial figures.
Most of the additional comments and suggested functions did not
deal with external auditor independence or internal auditing. Since 
the survey conducted did not present functions other than those related 
to these areas, suggested functions relating to other matters could 
be expected.
Correlation Analysis of Audit Comnittee Effectiveness and Certain 
Corporate and Committee Characteristics
Correlation analysis was used to measure the degree of associa­
tion between the number of audit committee functions performed 
effectively as perceived by audit committee members and certain 
characteristics of the corporation and the corporation's audit com­
mittee. Questionnaires sent to audit committee members solicited the 
following biographical information which was used in the correlation:
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total corporate assets, number of audit committee members, number of 
audit committee members with auditing backgrounds and period of time 
the audit committee has been in existence.
Size of Audit Committee. The survey results showed that the 
average size of an audit committee is 4.5 members, although 16% of 
the respondents indicated that their audit committee membership is 6 
or more. Only 1 respondent indicated that his audit committee had 2 
members. (See Table 15).
Background of Audit Committee Members. Results showed that 
little emphasis seems to be placed on an audit background for audit 
committee membership. The number of audit committee members with 
auditing backgrounds ranged from 0 - 4 ,  with an average of 1.0 mem­
ber. The largest percentage of respondents (32%) indicated that none 
of the members of their audit committee possessed an auditing back­
ground. (See Table 15).
Length of Time of Audit Committee Existence. The survey results 
also indicated that audit committees are relatively recent additions 
to the corporate organization. The majority of respondents (77%) 
indicated that their audit committee had been established within the 
last 10 years. Only 2% of the respondents indicated that their 
committee had existed for longer than 20 years. These results are 
summarized in Table 16.
Correlation Results. The Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was used in this analysis to determine some characteristics 
of an effective audit committee. This correlation coefficient is a 
measure of the strength of the relationship between variables.
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TABLE 15
SIZE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES AND BACKGROUND 
OF MEMBERS
Number of 
Members Audit Committee Members
Audit Committee Members 
With Audit Backgrounds
No. * No. 4
0 0 0 21 32
1 0 0 20 30
2 1 1 14 21
3 14 21 6 9
4 20 30 1 1
5 21 32 0 0
6 or more 11 16 0 0
No response 5 8
Total 67 100 67 100
TABLE 16




1 - 5 26 39
6 - 10 25 38
11 - 15 2 3
16 - 20 4 6
21 - 25 1 1
26 or mori! 1 1
No response 8 12
Total 67 100
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
91
Results showed no significant degree of association between effective 
audit committee performance as perceived by audit committee members 
and any of the correlated characteristics. (See Table 17)„
TABLE 17 
RESULTS OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Pearson Product-Moment 
Characteristic correlation s
________________________________ coefficient r Prob.
Total assets of company .109 .425
Number of committee members .079 .558
Number of committee members with
audit background -.057 .682
Years of audit committee existence .232 .106
Hypothesis that the degree of association is significant is rejected 
at<*= .05.
The results of this survey showed that differences in percep­
tion of current and desirable audit committee performance do exist. 
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial state­
ment users were selected as research participants because each group 
is affected by the work of audit committees. Each group has a 
particular relationship to audit committees and therefore has a 
perspecti e that differs from the other groups. An effectively 
functioning audit committee must serve the interests of all potential 
benefactors of its' work. The gap in perception indicated by this
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research will hamper audit committee effectiveness due to misunder­
standings of what audit committees can and should do as well as 
uncertainty about the role that audit committees should have within 
the corporate structure.
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CHAPTER IV
Summary and Conclusions
Public confidence in the corporate organization and the business 
community, in general, has weakened in recent years. Attempts by 
various segments have been made to reverse this trend. One of the 
more significant efforts has come in the form of increased responsi­
bility for corporate boards of directors. Audit committees, as sub­
committees of the board of directors, have been established in growing 
numbers to specifically address certain responsibilities of these 
boards of directors in financial affairs.
Although the establishment of audit committees is an attempt to 
solve some of the problems of poor corporate image, their growth has 
not been without difficulty. To date, there has been no clear 
delineation of audit committee objectives, functions and responsibili­
ties. Individual committees and the related boards of directors 
determine their role, responsibilities and functions. This has 
resulted in varying degrees of audit committee effectiveness. While 
some audit committees may be contributing significantly to the corporate 
structure, others may be existing only because of the New York Stock 
Exchange requirements.
The audit committee is expected to contribute to the overall 
objective of the audit function which is to increase the credibility, 
integrity and reliability of the financial reporting system.
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Business, investor and legal environmental changes have been 
significant in recent years and have caused concern about the corporate 
reporting system. There have been many changes in the business en­
vironment. The recent trend toward increased business combinations 
and expansions is unrivaled in American history. In addition, the 
internal reporting systems of corporations have become more sophisti­
cated and more reliable and timely information is available. Techno­
logical changes have also influenced the business environment as 
completely new industries have been created.
The investor environment has a new character predominantly because 
of the growth of financial analysis. Financial analysts are now 
representing the interests of many investors and are demanding more 
detailed and sophisticated corporate financial information.
Changes have taken place in the legal environment, increasing 
accountants’ legal liability. The number of suits against accountants 
has grown steadily since the early 1960s. No reversal of this trend 
is foreseen.
There is general agreement from the public sector and within the 
business community that it is the independent audit function that adds 
credibility to the financial statements. The endorsement of the 
independent auditor provides a measure of assurance to creditors, 
investors, government regulatory agencies and others that the financial 
statements can be relied upon.
One of the most important reasons for the faith placed in the 
independent auditor's opinion is his independence from the coiporation. 
Independence is also one of the most frequently attacked qualities.
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
96
Maintainance of independence in appearance and fact is of great con­
cern to independent auditors and the business community in general.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has consistently shown support 
for strengthening auditor independence and the AICPA has strong 
requirements in the Code of Ethics regarding independence.
One of the most recent and perhaps most serious attacks on the 
existence of auditor independence has come from the Metcalf Report. 
This Senate subcommittee report actually charged that the eighc 
largest CPA firms in the United States are not independent of their 
respective corporate clients.
The accounting profession, the SEC and responsible financial 
leaders recognize that an auditor’s appearance of independence is 
threatened where management has the responsibility for auditor selec­
tion, retention and replacement. Audit committees are recognized as 
being one vehicle for strengthening auditor independence. The rela­
tionship between the independent auditor and management could be 
minimized if audit committees work more closely with the independent 
auditor.
Audit committees can also aid in adding stature and importance to 
the internal audit function. Internal control and internal audit 
staffs have increased significantly and many of them have a vital role 
within the corporate organization. This is particularly true since 
the passage in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act made internal accounting con­
trols a matter of law for all public companies, not just those having 
foreign operations. The SEC has already charged some companies with
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violating the accounting provisions of the Act where questionable 
foreign payments were not an issue.
To be effective, internal control and internal auditing should 
be evaluated and monitored at the highest organizational level pos­
sible. The audit committee can effectively serve this purpose.
Through their contact with the audit committee, internal auditors will 
have access to the board of directors. A.s a result, internal auditors' 
recommendations for improving financial reporting will have a greater 
chance of being accepted and implemented.
Expectations of audit committee benefits are extensive. To 
effectively fulfill these expectations the audit committee must re­
assess its role, objectives and functions.
Historically, support for audit committees has come from various 
segments of the business community. The SEC has consistently encour­
aged all public corporations to establish audit committees. In 
Accounting Series Releases Nos. 19, 123, 126, and 165, the support for 
audit committees has been specifically stated. SEC court actions have 
resulted in requirements for the establishment of audit committees for 
certain corporations. In come cases, the SEC has listed detailed 
duties to be performed by these committees. Although the SEC has 
refrained from requiring audit committees for all public corporations, 
it has urged the American Institute of Certifieid Public Accountants 
to take this step.
The New York Stock Exchange support for audit committees resulted 
in the requirement that as of June 30, 1978, all listed members must 
have audit committees. NYSE support for audit committees was first
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evidenced as a result of the McKesson-Robbins case where the exchange 
report stated that where practicable independent auditors should be 
selected by a board of directors subcommittee.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants first 
showed its support for audit committees in a 1967 executive committee 
report. The report recommended that publicly owned corporations 
appoint committees of outside directors to nominate the independent 
auditors of a corporation's financial statements and discuss their 
audit work with them. The report also suggested that the auditor com­
municate with the audit committee on any significant matters not 
satisfactorily resolved at the management level. Since that time the 
AICPA has consistently supported audit committees and urged their 
establishment.
In 1978 a special committee of the AICPA reported that it found 
no reason to require audit committees as a prerequisite to conduct of 
the external audit. However, the committee also stated that it is 
convinced that audit committees can be helpful to corporate directors 
and independent auditors.
Congress has recently begun to express interest in the establish­
ment of audit committees. The Moss and Metcalf Committees both reported 
a belief that audit committees could improve the system of corporate 
accountability.
The large increase in the number of corporations with audit com­
mittees may be partly due to the extended responsibilities of boards of 
directors. Increasing legal liability on the part of board members 
has led to many protective actions including the establishment of
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audit committees.
With audit committees firmly established as a part of the 
corporate organization, attention must now be directed toward de­
fining committee objectives and functions. Ill-defined objectives 
and functions and a nebulous role could render audit committees in­
effective and leave many expectations unfulfilled.
The purpose of this study was to reveal the views of three groups 
with differing perspectives on certain functions of audit committees.
A comparison of the views expressed should give an insight into the 
present importance of audit committees and their expected future 
impact.
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial 
statement users were surveyed by mail questionnaire to determine their 
perceptions of the role and functions of corporate audit committees. 
Pairwise comparisons of group responses were made and differences 
noted. There was general agreement among groups that the functions 
presented for their consideration are currently effectively performed 
and should be performed in the future. Differences in degree of 
perception or agreement, however, were present in the majority of 
cases.
Summary and Implications of the Perceptions of CPA Firm Audit Partners
CPA firm audit partners were surveyed to determine their opinions 
on current audit committee performance, desirable audit committee 
performance, and the role of audit committees within the corporate 
organization. Generally, the CPAs surveyed indicated a belief that
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audit committees are performing the functions presented in the 
questionnaire with at least adequate effectiveness. However, 
responses of the CPAs implied that much improvement is needed.
The perceived need for overall improvement in audit committee 
effectiveness could be the result of unrealistic expectations 
by CPAs. With no authoritative guide to the responsibilities 
and functions of audit committees, effectiveness must be perceived 
by individuals. Therefore, CPAs who possess auditing backgrounds 
may expect a higher standard of performance from audit committees 
than is practical or possible. To fulfill all of the functions 
listed to the satisfaction of CPAs who are educated and experi­
enced in the audit area could be a long and tedious process for 
audit committees.
Another important perception identified by this research is 
that CPAs were of the opinion that audit committee functions 
related to external auditor independence were more effectively 
performed than those functions related to internal audit. One 
reason for this opinion may be that internal auditing as com­
pared to external auditing is relatively new to many companies 
and therefore may receive less emphasis by audit committees. 
Another reason may be that CPAs are not aware of how effectively 
internal audit related functions are being performed. Obviously, 
CPAs have a more intimate knowledge of audit committee perform­
ance related to external auditor independence.
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Desirable Audit Committee Functions. CPAs were generally 
enthusiastic in their support of the external auditor independence 
and internal audit related functions presented in the question­
naire. CPAs, however, attached more importance to audit committee 
performance of external auditor independence related functions than 
to those functions related to internal audit. Perhaps understand­
ably, CPAs are more concerned with audit committee functions that 
affect them directly. Such an implication sharply points out the 
need for the responsibilities assigned to audit committees to re­
flect the expectations of all groups that could be affected.
The function considered most important by CPAs was that audit 
committees discuss with independent auditors their experiences and 
problems in completing the audit. A significant majority (82%) of 
the responding CPAs strongly agreed that this should be an audit 
committee function. The desire for an increased separation from 
management and therefore an increased appearance of independence is 
clearly implied. The results of this research support the conten­
tion by the AICPA, state and local CPA societies and individual 
CPAs that the profession is constantly seeking to improve and 
strengthen auditor independence in appearance and in fact.
The Role of Audit Committees in the Corporation Organization.
CPAs indicated a belief that audit committees enhance the credibil­
ity and integrity of financial statements. The importance of the audit 
committee to the coiporate organization is specifically related to its
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contribution toward improving financial reporting. Survey results 
indicated that CPAs believe such a contribution is being made.
CPAs did not believe, however, that external auditor verifica­
tion of audit committee effectiveness constitutes desirable and useful 
information. Admittedly, verification of audit committee effective­
ness would be difficult and would also add to the responsibility of 
the auditor. CPAs may believe that the resulting verification will 
not be beneficial enough to warrant the extra time and effort that 
would be involved. Also, the increased responsibility would give 
rise to another area for potential legal liability for the external 
auditor. In a period already plagued with greatly increased liti­
gation against the CPAs, this is clearly not desirable. CPAs are 
justified in considering very carefully any additional responsibility. 
The statement presented in the questionnaire for consideration stated 
that auditor verification would be desirable and useful information.
The possibility exists that CPAs, in an attempt to convey an unwilling­
ness to perform such a verification, disagreed with the desirability 
and usefulness of such information.
Opinions of CPAs and AICPA Support for Audit Committees. The 
AICPA has shown enthusiastic support for the establishment of audit 
committees. However, a recent AICPA committee designated to study 
whether audit committees should be required before an audit could be 
performed concluded that the AICPA should not have such a requirement. 
The results of this research indicated that the responding CPAs agreed 
with the position of the AICPA. If audit committees were required 
before an external audit could be performed, a judgment would have to
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be made by the auditor on the effectiveness of the committee. Clearly, 
survey results showed that CPAs do not want this responsibility even 
though survey participants agreed with the importance and desirability 
of all audit committee functions in the questionnaire.
Summary and Inplications of the Perceptions of Audit Committee Members
Audit committee members were surveyed to determine their percep­
tions of current audit committee performance, desirable audit committee 
functions and the role of audit committees within the corporate 
structure. Audit committee members consistently expressed a belief 
that their committee was functioning very effectively in the performance 
of the functions presented. Such a strong opinion may have resulted 
from a lack of understanding of what is expected of an effective audit 
committee. Audit committee composition may also be influencing the 
members1 perceptions of their effectiveness.
The survey results showed that 32% of the respondents indicated 
that their audit committee had no members with auditing backgrounds.
In addition, the average number of audit committee members with 
auditing backgrounds indicated by all respondents was less than 1.
Even though the correlation analysis showed no significant degree of 
association between audit committee effectiveness and the number of 
members with auditing background, the lack of sufficient knowledge of 
auditing could cause audit committee members to experience extreme 
difficulty in identifying and performing desirable audit committee 
functions. This lack of knowledge could also contribute to a mistaken 
belief by audit committee members that they are performing at maximum
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effectiveness.
Desirable Audit Committee Functions. Audit committee members 
were in agreement that all external auditor independence and internal 
audit related functions should be performed by audit committees. Much 
more emphasis was placed on the performance of external auditor 
independence related functions, however. Less importance may be 
attached to internal audit functions because audit committee involve­
ment with internal audit activities may not be stressed by the board 
of directors or the role of internal audit within the corporation may 
not be considered important by management.
The audit committee function deemed most desirable by audit 
committee members is that audit committees should discuss with inde­
pendent auditors their experiences and problems in completing the 
audit. An overwhelming majority (961) of the responding audit 
committee members indicated they strongly agreed with the desirability 
of this function. Another function which received substantial support 
from audit committee members is that the committee should consult 
with the independent auditors (out of the presence of management) with 
regard to the adequacy of internal controls. Strong agreement with 
the desirability of this function was expressed by 91% of the committee 
members surveyed.
The Role of Audit Committees in the Corporate Structure. Although 
the majority of audit committee members expressed a belief that 
external auditor verification of the effective functioning of audit 
committees would be desirable and useful information, a substantial 
percentage (30%) disagreed. Many audit committee members are obviously
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doubtful about some aspect of this statement. Since no pre-established 
standards for audit committees exist, some audit committee members may 
believe external auditor verification is not reasonably possible. 
Therefore, a belief that verification is impossible may have caused 
some respondents to disagree with the usefulness of such information. 
However, the indication by most respondents, that external auditor 
verification is desirable, implies that audit committee members are 
confident enough about their ability to perform adequately that they 
are willing to submit to outside scrutiny.
The majority of audit committee members (811) also agreed that 
the existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and 
integrity of corporate financial reporting. The results of this 
survey indicated that audit committee members clearly visualize their 
committees as an important part of the corporate organization.
Opinions of Audit Committee Members and the Increased Responsi­
bilities of Boards of Directors. Corporate boards of directors are 
facing increasing responsibilities to meet the challenges of increased 
company size and complexity, an increased number of lawsuits against 
directors and an increased obligation to exercise reasonable care in 
the fulfillment of their duties. The large measure of support given 
to the desirability of the audit committee functions presented in 
this survey indicates that audit committee members intend to meet 
these challenges. The effective performance of the duties deemed 
desirable will require audit committee members to be diligent in 
acquiring knowledge of the external and internal audit activities of 
their companies and devote adequate time to give proper attention to
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audit committee responsibilities. The results of this research imply 
an awareness of and a willingness by audit committee members to meet 
their growing responsibilities.
Summary and Implications of Perceptions of Financial Statement Users
Of the three groups surveyed, financial statement users attached 
less importance to the desirability of most of the audit committee 
functions. Higher peicentages of respondents also expressed uncertainty 
as to whether the listed functions should be performed. However, since 
the survey results did show that financial statement users believe 
that audit committees should perform the functions presented (even 
though their agreement was shown to a lesser degree than that of CPAs 
or audit committee members) the indication is that financial state­
ment users believe audit committees are desirable. Financial statement 
users may not be entirely convinced, however, that audit committees 
represent superior tools for improving corporate accountability. Since 
financial statement users are toe final beneficiaries of any attempt 
to improve the corporate reporting system, their understanding of the 
work of audit committees, which represents such an attempt, is essen­
tial. Perhaps a problem of communication of information concerning 
audit committees is indicated here.
The Role of Audit Committees in the Corporate Structure. Financial 
statement users generally agreed that audit committee existence and 
external audit verification of effectiveness both have favorable ef­
fects on financial reporting. The reason for this opinion may be 
because financial statement users are required to evaluate the
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financial position of companies and may believe that any additional 
information which does not cause confusion is desirable. Financial 
statement users also have the option of disregarding any information 
deemed unnecessary in certain circumstances. Therefore, financial 
statement users may want information about audit committees whether 
or not substantial consideration will be given to it.
Opinions of Financial Statement Users and SEC and Congressional 
Support for Audit Committees. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
has consistently expressed support for the establishment of audit 
committees through accounting series releases and litigation. Con­
gressional committees have urged the establishment of audit committees 
to strengthen and improve financial reporting. Both of these bodies 
are concerned with the adequacy and fairness of corporate reporting 
to stockholders and the general public. Financial statement users, 
as representatives of stockholders and members of the general public, 
are in agreement that audit committees can make a contribution toward 
better financial reporting. However, the results of this survey 
indicated that the enthusiasm shown for desirable audit committee 
functions and the importance attached to the existence and effec­
tiveness of audit committees by financial statement users was mild.
The support of the SEC and Congress for audit committees seems to 
be much greater than that of financial statement users, whose 
interests they seek to protect.
Implications of the Differences in Perceived Importance of Audit 
Committee Performance of External Auditor Independence Related 
Functions and Internal Audit Related Functions
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Survey results indicated a difference between the perceived 
desirability of external auditor independence and internal audit 
related functions. The potential impact of this discrepancy may be 
far-reaching in that all groups attached less importance to audit 
committee performance of internal audit related functions. Boards of 
directors, management and internal auditors must reassess the objec­
tives and responsibilities of internal audit staffs in light of this 
finding.
Reasons for the lesser degree of importance attached to internal 
audit functions may be the result of lack of corporate support for 
internal auditing. The widespread establishment of internal audit 
departments by corporations is relatively new. Therefore, many of 
these internal audit departments may still be struggling to convince 
management of the importance of the contribution that can be made 
toward improving corporate accountability. Lack of management sup­
port leads to ill-defined objectives and goals and lack of authority 
to require implementation of recommendations made by internal 
auditors.
Also, the unenthusiastic support for internal audit related 
functions implies a lack of understanding as well as a lack of faith 
in the work of internal auditors. Audit committee members and 
financial statement users particularly may be unsure of the role that 
internal auditing should play in the overall audit process.
Summary and Implications of Correlation Analysis
The survey results showed no significant degree of association
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between the number of effectively performed audit committee func­
tions (as perceived by audit committee members) and the following 
characteristics: (1) total assets of the company; (2) size of the 
audit committee; (3) number of audit committee members with auditing 
backgrounds, and (4j years of audit committee existence. From this 
research, no implications can be drawn that these characteristics re­
late in any way to an effective audit committee.
Comparison of Survey Results With the Metcalf Report aid the SEC 
Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission’s 
Oversight Role
To date the most authoritative pronouncements concerning audit 
committee functions have come from the Metcalf Committee and the SEC. 
The survey results showed that audit committee members, CPA firm audit 
partners and financial statement users substantially agreed with both 
of these reports.
There is specific agreement among all parties that the aduit com­
mittee should engage and dismiss the independent auditor. The Metcalf 
Report, however, is general in recommending that the audit committee 
should meet privately with the independent auditor and receive full 
reports from the auditing firm on its findings. The SEC report 
addresses relations with the independent auditor more specifically by 
recommending that the committee review with the independent auditor, 
upon completion of their audit, such items as the proposed audit report 
or opinion, any unusual and significant transactions, changes in 
accounting principles and practices, significant adjustments, and 
recommendations for improving internal control. A conparison of
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survey responses to similar functions showed substantial agreement 
with the reports. For example, respondents in all categories favored 
audit committee performance of the following functions:
(1) discuss with independent auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing the audit
(2) discuss meaning and significance of audited 
figures and notes thereto
(3) review the extent to which recommendations 
made by the independent auditor have been 
implemented.
The Metcalf and SEC reports both recommended that the audit 
committee be concerned with the audit fee. The Metcalf Report sug­
gests the committee actually set the fee while the SEC Report favors 
a review after the fee is determined. Although no function listed in 
the survey related to the audit fee, the additional comments from 
many of the CPA firm audit partners supported some form of audit com­
mittee consideration of the audit fee.
Another function not presented in the questionnaire but which 
received support in additional comments was audit committee review of 
non-audit services performed by independent auditors. Both the 
Metcalf and SEC reports agreed that audit committees should be informed 
of or review any non-audit service.
Many survey respondents suggested in additional comments audit 
committee functions that relate to management. The SEC Report also 
recommends several functions that are management-related. Survey 
respondents and the SEC were in general agreement on audit committee 
performance of the following specific functions:
Cl) Review with management a company's policies 
and procedures with respect to internal 
auditing, accounting and financial controls.
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(2) Inquire of the appropriate company personnel 
as to any instances of deviations from estab­
lished codes of conduct of the company.
(3) Meet with the company’s financial staff 
periodically to review and discuss with 
them the scope of internal accounting 
and auditing procedures then in effect.
The Metcalf Report does not mention any recommendations of audit
committee involvement with management.
The Metcalf and SEC reports and the survey respondents favor 
audit committee involvement with internal controls and internal 
auditing. The Metcalf Report states that a major purpose of the 
corporate audit committee is to improve internal auditing controls.
The SEC Report suggests that the committee review a company’s policies 
and procedures with respect to internal auditing, accounting and 
financial controls, and review and discuss with the company's financial 
staff the extent to which recommendations made by the internal staff 
have been implemented. Survey respondents showed support for all 
functions of the audit committee that relate to internal control and 
internal auditing.
The results of this research showed substantial agreement among 
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial state­
ment users with the audit committee recommendations of the Metcalf 
Committee and the SEC Report. There is overall support for the 
audit committee to assume a role in relations with independent auditors 
and the internal auditing staff. As noted previously, however, the 
SEC Report and survey respondents indicated an interest in audit 
committee performance of specific management-related functions. The
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Metcalf Report does not mention any specific involvement with manage­
ment but the report does state that audit committees should establish 
appropriate policies to prohibit unethical, questionable or illegal 
activities by corporate employees. The intent of this statement may 
have been to encourage a closer review of management activities.
Recommendations
Survey results showed significant gaps in the perceptions of 
CPAs, audit committee members and financial statement users concerning 
the role and functions of audit committees. The identification of 
these gaps by this research specifically points to problems that 
could cause audit committees, which may become powerful tools in the 
quest for improved financial integrity, to be lost in a mass of con­
fusion and misunderstanding. Therefore, the need for an authoritative 
prescription of minimum audit committee duties and responsibilities 
is necessary. This authoritative prescription could come from the 
SEC, a government agency designated to protect stockholders or the 
AICPA, the leading organization of the auditing profession.
Based on the survey results the following functions are recom­
mended for inclusion in an authoritative guide for audit committees. 
The functions are listed in order of importance as indicated by the 
strength of support given by participants in all groups:
(1) External auditor independence related functions:
(a) Discuss with independent auditors their 
experiences and problems in completing 
the audit.
(b) Consult with the independent auditors 
(out of the presence of management) with 
regard to the adequacy of internal con­
trols.
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(c) Ascertain whether management has taken proper 
action on independent auditor recommenda­
tions .
(d) Approve or nominate independent auditors.
(e) Discuss meaning and significance of audited 
figures and notes thereto.
(f) Recommend termination of external auditors 
when necessary.
(g) Discuss scope and timing of independent audit work.
(2 ) Internal audit related functions:
(a) Discuss effectiveness of internal control 
with the internal auditors.
(b) Ascertain whether management has taken proper 
action on the internal auditors* recommenda­
tions.
(c) Discuss internal audit findings and recom­
mendations with internal auditors.
(d) Discuss organization and independence of 
internal auditors.
(e) Consult with internal auditors (out of the 
presence of management) with regard to the 
adequacy of internal controls.
(f) Discuss goals and plans, including nature 
and extent of work, of the internal audit 
function.
(g) Discuss with internal auditors their ex­
periences and problems in completing 
audits.
(h) Evaluate the adequacy of staffing for in­
ternal auditing.
In addition, increased emphasis should be placed on internal 
auditing by boards of directors and audit committees. This increased 
emphasis would lead to a greater respect for and understanding of 
the purpose of internal auditing. Therefore, the perceived desirability
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would be enhanced. Audit committee effectiveness as well as the 
stature of the internal audit department would also be improved.
Areas for Further Research
First, a determination of the proper background for audit committee 
members is necessary. The composition of audit committees is of para­
mount importance in insuring effectiveness. The educational and 
experience background of a member directly affects the contribution 
he rail make to the audit committee. If the background that seems 
to provide the best foundation for audit committee performance could 
be determined, then prospective members could be screened for certain 
characteristics before serving on audit committees. If the quality 
of members improves, the quality of the work of the audit committee 
will also improve.
Secondly, audit committees can and probably do perform functions 
that do not relate to the external auditor or internal control and 
internal auditing. These functions should be identified. As evi­
denced by the additional comments, many of the survey respondents 
think the committee should be performing some non-audit related 
functions. The possibility exists, however, that if the external 
auditor independence and internal audit related functions are per­
formed effectively, the need for additional functions may be lessened. 
Further investigation is needed.
Third, no attempt was made in this research to categorize 
functions appropriate to certain industries or other specific circum­
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stances. Rec lition must be given to the fact that some audit com­
mittee functions may be specifically necessary for particular companies. 
There should always be flexibility in audit committee functioning, but 
the desirability of certain required minimum standards is obvious.
Conclusion
Audit committees can be an integral part of the corporate 
organization for all companies. The circumstances under which these 
committees operate, however, will greatly affect their impact. Ill- 
defined objectives and functions could hamper what is possibly the 
most important step toward improving coiporate accountability in 
recent years
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College o f Business Adm inistration
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
September 15, 1979
Dear CPA Firm Audit Partner:
With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all 
its listed corporations must have audit committees as of June 30, 1978, 
audit committees have become an inescapable part of the corporate 
organization structure. The establishment of audit committees has 
also been endorsed by other authoritative bodies such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of 
the objectives, responsibilities and functions of audit committees.
Each corporation's board of directors or the audit committee itself 
has to determine its role within the organization.
I am currently conducting a survey to determine the perceptions 
of CPA Firm audit partners concerning the present role of corporate 
audit committees and what the committee's role should be in the future. 
Your participation by filling out the enclosed brief questionnaire would 
be greatly appreciated*
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses will be used in statistical 
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please send 
this request to me on a card separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,
Brenda S. Birkett
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
For category 1 and category 2, please circle your response to the question 
stated at the top of the column. The possible responses range from:
Category 1: 1 - performed very effectively to 5 - not currently performed 
Category 2: 1 - strongly agree to 5 - strongly disagree
Category 1
Do over one-half of 
the audit committees 




Do you think audit 
committees should 




Discuss with independent 
auditors their experi­
ences and problems in 
completing the audit
Disuss scope and timing 
of independent audit 
work
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and 
significance of audited 
figures and notes 
thereto
Recommend termination 
of external auditors 
when necessary
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5




ment has taken proper 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of manage- 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
ment) with regard to the 
adequacy of internal 
controls
Internal Audit related 
Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
internal auditors
Discuss organization
and independence of 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
internal auditors
Evaluate the adequacy
of staffing for 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
internal auditing
Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen- 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
dations with internal
auditors
Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function
Discuss with internal
auditors their experi- 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5








auditors (out of the 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
presence of management) 
with regard to the ade­
quacy of internal controls
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Please give your opinion on the following questions, using the category 2 
responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).
If the external auditor could verify the effective functioning of the 
audit committee according to a set of pre-established standards, this 
would be desirable and useful information.
1 2 3 4 5
The existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and integrity 
of corporate financial reporting.
1 2 3 4 5
Please list any functions not previously listed that you think audit committees 
should perform and make any comments below.
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B A T O N  R O U G E  . L O U I S I A N A  • 70803 
College o f Business Adm inistration
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
September 15, 1979
Dear Audit Committee Member:
With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all 
its listed corporations must have audit committees as of June 30, 1978, 
audit committees have become an inescapable part of the corporate 
organization structure. The establishment of audit committees has 
also been endorsed by other authoritative bodies such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of 
the objectives, responsibilities and functions of audit committees.
Each corporation's board of directors or the audit committee itself 
has to determine its role within the organization.
I am currently conducting a survey to determine the perceptions 
of audit committee members concerning what their present role is 
and what it should be. Your participation by filling out the enclosed 
brief questionnaire would be greatly appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses will be used in statistical 
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please send 
this request to me on a card separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,
Brenda S. Birkett
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
For category 1 and category 2, please circle your response to the question 
stated at the top of the column. The possible responses range from:
Category 1 : 1 - performed very effectively to 5 - not currently performed
Category 2 : 1 - strongly agree to 5 - strongly disagree
Category 1




Do you think your 
audit committee should 





auditors their experi- 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
ences and problems in 
completing the audit
Disuss scope and timing
of independent audit 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
work
Approve or nominate
independent auditors 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
Discuss meaning and




of external auditors 1 2  3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5
when necessary




ment has taken proper 1 2
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of manage- 1 2
ment) with regard to the 
adequacy of internal 
controls
Internal Audit related
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 1 2
internal auditors
Discuss organization
and independence of 1 2
internal auditors
Evaluate the adequacy
of staffing for 1 2
internal auditing
Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen- 1 2
dations with internal
auditors
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and 1 2
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experi- 1 2




proper action on the 1 2
internal auditors'
recommendat ions
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of the 1 2
presence of management) 
with regard to the ade­
quacy of internal controls
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
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Please give your opinion on the following questions, using the category 2 
responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).
If the external auditor could verify the effective functioning of the 
audit committee according to a set of pre-established standards, this 
would be desirable and useful information.
1 2 3 4 5
The existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and integrity 
of corporate financial reporting.
1 2 3 4 5
Please give the following information about your company.
1. What are the total assets of your company as of December 31, 1978
to the nearest million?
2. How many members does your audit committee have as of December 31, 1978?
3. How many audit committee members have auditing backgrounds?
4. How long has your company had an audit committee?
Please list any functions not listed previously that you think audit committees 
should perform and make any comments below.
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B A T O N  R O U G E  • L O U I S I A N A  . 70803 
College o f Business Adm inistration
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
September 15, 1979
Dear Financial Statement User:
With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all 
its listed corporations must have audit committees as of June 30, 1978, 
audit committees have become an inescapable part of the corporate 
organization structure. The establishment of audit committees has 
also been endorsed by other authoritative bodies such as tin Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of 
the objectives, responsibilities and functions of audit committees.
Each corporation’s board of directors or the audit committee itself 
has to determine its role within the organization.
I am currently conducting a survey to determine the perceptions 
of financial statement users concerning the present role of corporate 
audit committees. Your participation by filling out the enclosed 
brief questionnaire would be greatly appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses will be used in statistical 
tabulations onlyv
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please send 
this request to me on a card separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,
Brenda S. Birkett
R eprodu ced  with perm ission  of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
130
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
Please circle your response to the question stated at the top of the 
column* The possible responses range from:
1 - strongly agree to 5 - strongly disagree
Do you think audit 
committees should 




Discuss with independent 
auditors their experi­
ences and problems in 
completing the audit
Disuss scope and timing 
of independent audit 
work
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and 
significance of audited 
figures and notes 
thereto
Recommend termination 
of external auditors 
when necessary
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action- on independent 
auditor recommendations
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of manage­
ment) with regard to the 
adequacy of internal 
controls
Internal Audit related
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
Discuss organization 
and independence of 
internal auditors
Evaluate the adequacy 
of staffing for 
internal auditing
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommen­
dations with internal 
auditors
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and 
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experi­
ences and problems in 
completing audits
Ascertain whether 
management has taken 
proper action on the 
internal auditors' 
recommendations
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of the 
presence of management) 
with regard to the ade­
quacy of internal controls
2
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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Please give your opinion on the following questions, using the previous 
responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).
If the external auditor could verify the effective functioning of the 
audit committee according to a set of pre-established standards, this 
would be desirable and useful information.
1 2 3 4 5
Ihe existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and integrity 
of corporate financial reporting.
1 2 3 4 5
Please list any functions not previously listed that you think audit committees 
should perform and make any comments below.
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College of Business Administration
Department of Accounting
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803
Dear CPA Firm Audit Partner:
You were recently sent a letter requesting your participation 
in a questionnaire survey concerning the present role of corporate 
audit committees and what the committee's role should be In the 
future. Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities, 
and functions will have an impact on all segments of the business 
community. This research is very important in that there has been 
no clear delineation of these objectives, responsibilities and 
functions.
Enclosed is another copy of the brief questionnaire. If you 
did not respond to the original request, your participation would 
still be appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses wiil be used in statistical 
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study please 
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College of Business Administration
Department of Accounting
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803
Dear Audit Committee Member:
You were recently sent a letter requesting your participation 
in a questionnaire survey concerning the present role of corporate 
audit committees and what the committee's role should be in the 
future. Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities, 
and functions will have an impact on all segments of the business 
community. This research is very important in that there has been 
no clear delineation of these objectives, responsibilities and 
functions.
Enclosed is another copy of the brief questionnaire. If you 
did not respond to the original request, your participation would 
still be appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses will be used in statistical 
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study please 
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College of Business Administration
Department of Accounting
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803
Dear Financial Statement User:
You were recently sent a letter requesting your participation 
in a questionnaire survey concerning the present role of corporate 
audit committees and what the committee's role should be in the 
future. Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities, 
and functions will have an impact on all segments of the business 
community. This research is very important in that there has been 
no clear delineation of these objectives, responsibilities and 
functions.
Enclosed is another copy of the brief questionnaire. If you 
did not respond to the original request, your participation would 
still be appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses will be used in statistical 
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study please 
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College of Business Administration^ j p j j  y j Department of Accounting
OEL. / v — ! L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA ■ 70803
January 28, 1980
Dear CPA Audit Partner:
Y ou were recently sent a questionnaire concerning the 
objectives, functions and responsibilities of audit committees. 
The d e t e r m ination of the audit committees' role within the 
c orporate o rganization is very important and your response 
to the q uestionnaire will be very valuable in this research.
If you did not respond to the original request, please 
answer the enclosed q u e stionnaire and return it immediately.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All 
r esponses will remain anonymous. Your response will be used 
in statistical tabulations only.
If you wou l d  like a copy of the results of this study, 
please send this request to me on a card separate from your 
questionnaire.
S i n c e r e l y ,
, ^ ,C£C
Brenda S. Birkett
R eprodu ced  with p erm ission  of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
137
College of Business Administration
Department of Accounting
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803
January 28, 1980
Dear Audit Committee Member:
You were recently sent a questionnaire concerning the 
objectives, functions and responsibilities of audit committees. 
The determination of the audit committees' role within the 
corporate organization is very important and your response 
to the questionnaire will be very valuable in this research.
If you did not respond to the original request, please 
answer the enclosed questionnaire and return it immediately.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All 
responses will remain anonymous. You;: response will be used 
in s tatistical tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, 
please send this request to me on a card separate from your 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
Si n c e r e l y ,
Brenda S. Birkett
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College of Business Administration
Department of Accounting
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803
J anuary 28, 1980
Dear Financial Statement User:
You were recently sent a q u estionnaire concerning the 
objectives, functions and responsibilities of audit committees. 
The determination of the audit c o m m i t t e e s ' role w i thin the 
corporate organiz a t i o n  is very important and your response 
to the questionnaire will be very v a l uable in this research.
If you did not respond to the o riginal request, please 
a nswer the enclosed questionnaire and return it immediately.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire. All 
responses will remain anonymous. Your response will be used 
in statistical tabulations only.
If you w o u l d  like a copy of the results of this study, 
please send this request to me on a card s eparate from your 
ques t i o n n a i r e .
S i n c e r e l y ,
• ■ }r:' / U c l ,  0  t y-/i( C t
B renda S. Birkett
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DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH 
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS 
EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION? 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experience 
and problems in completing 
the audit
18 46 27 9 0 27 37 36 0 0
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 46 36 18 0 0 37 36 27 0 0
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 55 18 9 9 9 45 18 27 0 0
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
27 9 46 18 0 46 36 9 9 0
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 11 11 45 11 22 38 0 62 0 0
necessary
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
37 27 18 18 0 36 55 9 0 0




















TABLE B 1 (Continued)
Respondents Nonresnondents
Function 1 2  3 4 5 1 2 3 4 S
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
37 36 27 0 0 27 46 27 0 0






















DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH 
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS 
INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
9 55 18 18 0 18 55 27 0 0
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
18 27 46 9 0 18 46 36 0 0
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
18 9 27 28 18 9 18 55 18 0
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommenda­
tions with internal 
auditors
18 18 27 28 9 36 36 28 0 0
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and 
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function






















TABLE B 2 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
audits
0 37 18 27 18 27 18 46 9 0
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on the internal 
auditors' recommendations
9 27 18 46 0 36 36 28 0 0
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of the 
presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
9 9 27 27 28 27 9 46 0 18





















DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS EXTERNAL 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION? 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
86 14 0 0 0 86 14 0 0 0
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 57 14 29 0 0 72 14 14 0 0
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary
14 0 0 0
72 28 0 0 0
72 14 0 0 14
72 28





















TABLE B 3 (Continued)
Function Respondents Nonrespondents
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
86 14 0 0 0 
100 0 0 0 0
86 14 0 0 0 
100 0 0 0 0






















DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS INTERNAL 
AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Responsents Nonrespondents
Function i 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
86 14 0 0 0 72 28 0 0 0
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
86 0 14 0 0 57 29 14 0 0
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
72 14 14 0 0 43 29 14 0 14
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommenda­
tions with internal 
auditors
72 14 14 0 0 42 29 29 0 0
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and 
extent of work, of the 
internal audit function






















TABLE B 4 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with internal 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
audits
72 14 14 0 0 43 14 29 0 14
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on the internal 
auditors’ recommendations
72 28 0 0 0 57 43 0 0 0
Consult with internal 
auditors (out of the 
presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
86 14 0 0 0 58 14 14 0 14





















DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD 
BE PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
82 9 9 0 0 73 27 0 0 0
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 82 18 0 0 0 91 9 0 0 0
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 82 0 9 9 0 70 20 10 0 0
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
64 36 0 0 0 82 9 0 9 0
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary






















TABLE B 5 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Ascertain whether manage­
ment has taken proper 
action on independent 
auditor recommendations
73 18 9 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the ade­
quacy of internal controls
73 27 0 0 0 82 9 0 9 0





















DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonresp ondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
73 27 0 0 0 45 55 0 0 0
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
64 27 9 0 0 55 45 0 0 0
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
auditing
37 45 9 0 9 46 27 27 0 0
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommen­
dations with internal 
auditors
45 55 0 0 0 82 18 0 0 0
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and extent 
of work, of the internal 
audit function























TABLE B 6 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with internal auditors 
their experiences and problems 
in completing audits
27 55 9 0 9 55 36 9 0 0
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on the 
internal auditors' recommenda­
tions
45 55 0 0 0 73 27 0 0 0
Consult with internal auditors 
(out of the presence of manage­
ment) with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
27 46 18 0 9 64 27 0 9 0



















DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
RELATED FUNCTION?




1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
100 0 0 0 0 86 14 0 0 0
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 66 17 17 0 0 72 14 14 0 0
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 100 0 0 0 0 86 14 0 0 0
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto 100 0 0 0 0 86 14 0 0 0
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary





















TABLE B 7 (Continued)
Function Respondents Nonrespondents
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on 
independent auditor recom­
mendations
100 0 0 0 0 86 14 0 0 0
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
100 0 0 0 0 86 14 0 0 0























DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 




1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with 
the internal auditors
100 0 0 0 0 72 28 0 0 0
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
100 0 0 0 0 57 29 0 14 0
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal auditing 100 0 0 0 0 57 29 0 0 14
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommenda­
tions with the internal 
auditors
83 0 17 0 0 43 29 14 14 0
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and extent 
of work, of the internal 
audit function





















TABLE B 8 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with internal auditors 
their experiences and problems 
in completing audits
83 0 17 0 0 43 14 29 0 14
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on the 
internal auditors' recommenda­
tions
100 0 0 0 0 71 29 0 0 0
Consult with internal auditors 
(out of the presence of manage­
ment) with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
100 0 0 0 0 58 14 14 0 14





















DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with independent 
auditors their experiences 
and problems in completing 
the audit
67 11 11 0 11 56 11 11 22 0
Discuss scope and timing 
of independent audit work 45 22 0 22 11 45 22 22 11 0
Approve or nominate 
independent auditors 67 11 22 0 0 78 0 0 11 11
Discuss meaning and signi­
ficance of audited figures 
and notes thereto
67 11 0 0 22 56 22 11 11 0
Recommend termination of 
external auditors when 
necessary





















TABLE B 9 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on 
independent auditor recom­
mendations
56 22 11 0 11 78 0 11 0 11
Consult with the inde­
pendent auditors (out of 
the presence of management) 
with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
56 22 11 0 11 89 0 0 11 0





















DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE 
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION? 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss effectiveness of 
internal control with the 
internal auditors
56 0 22 11 11 67 11 0 22 0
Discuss organization and 
independence of internal 
auditors
33 33 23 • 0 11 33 33 11 23 0
Evaluate the adequacy of 
staffing for internal 
a u d i t i n g
33 11 33 23 0 22 11 67 0 0
Discuss internal audit 
findings and recommen­
dations with internal 
auditors
45 22 22 11 0 45 22 11 22 0
Discuss goals and plans, 
including nature and extent 
of work, of the internal 
audit function






















TABLE B 10 (Continued)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Function 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Discuss with internal auditors 
their experiences and problems 
in completing audits
45 22 11 22 0 33 11 33 23 0
Ascertain whether management 
has taken proper action on 
the internal auditors1 recom­
mendations
56 11 22 11 0 45 22 22 11 0
Consult with internal auditors 
(out of the presence of manage­
ment) with regard to the adequacy 
of internal controls
34 22 11 22 11 45 33 11 11 0






















AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
If the external auditor could verify 
the effective functioning of the 
audit committee according to a set 
of pre-established standards, this 
would be desirable and useful in­
formation
9 27 9 18 37 0 18 18 46 18
The existence of an audit committee 
enhances the credibility and in­
tegrity of corporate financial 
reporting
37 18 36 0 9 55 45 0 0 0






















AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING 
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
(Responses in Percentages)
Respondents Nonrespondents
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
If the external auditor could 
verify the effective function­
ing of the audit committee 
according to a set of pre- 
established standards, this would 
be desirable and useful informa­
tion
72 14 0 0 14 29 14 14 0 43
The existence of an audit 
committee enhances the 
credibility and integrity 
of corporate financial 
reporting
86 14 0 0 0 57 43 0 0 0






















AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING 




1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
If the external auditor could 
verify the effective function­
ing of the audit committee ac­
cording to a set of preestablished 
standards, this would be desirable 
and useful information
23 33 33 0 11 33 33 34 0 0
The existence of an audit 
committee enhances the 
credibility and integrity 
of corporate financial 
reporting
56 33 0 0 11 11 56 22 11 0
: The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagreeNOTE
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